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Louisiana's recent passage of a "covenant marriage" law is the first
successful attack on the no-fault divorce revolution of the Seventies. The law has
been championed by supporters as a return to marriages that matter and
attacked by detractors as a draconian interference in the private lives of
Louisiana's citizens. This Note gives a detailed analysis of the law and
concludes that the political uproar surrounding the law has obscured the purely
legal issues raised by its passage.
This Note addresses several legal arguments against the law and concludes
that its major flaw lies in its failure to take into account basic conflicts of law
principles. The oversight proves to be one that renders the law ineffective in
many situations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even if marriage has never been easy, it has usually been simple-that is,
when two people get married, it is generally understood that they are bound
together not only by their vows to each other, but also by the laws of their state.
Occasionally, though, things get more complicated-especially when there are
questions about the legality of the marriage. In the past, those questions have
usually centered on problems of validity-for example, if Jerry Lee and his
thirteen-year-old third cousin marry1 in one state, and that marriage would have
been illegal under the laws of another state, is the marriage valid? In such cases,
courts have generally held that if the marriage was valid when performed and
legal in the state where performed, it should be deemed valid in all other states,
even if it could never have been performed in those states. Likewise, divorce can
raise similar thorny conflicts of law issues; questions in this area have generally
turned on whether the party seeking a divorce was properly domiciled according
* The author would like to thank all of those who pointed him in the right directions,
including Professors Sanford Caust-Ellenbogen, Katherine Federle, David Goldberger, Arthur
Greenbaum, Peter Swire, and Dean Nancy Rapoport. Special thanks to Stephen A. Silver,
whose suggestions on the earlier drafts were invaluable, as well as to the staff of the Ohio State
Law Journal. Most of all, though, the author would like to thank his parents.
This Note was the winner of the Rebecca Topper Memorial Award for outstanding
writing contribution to the Ohio State Law Journal by a third-year student.
1 See generally MYRA LEWIs & MURRAY SILVER, GREAT BALLS OF FRE: THE
UNCENSORED STORY OF JERRY LEE LmWis (1982).
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to the state's divorce laws.
On July 15, 1997, Louisiana adopted a law that defies the traditional
conflicts of law analysis of marriage and divorce and became the first state in the
union to create a new marriage institution-the covenant marriage.2 A Louisiana
covenant marriage is like a "normal" Louisiana marriage in all ways except one:
a couple who enters a covenant marriage cannot end the marriage by a no-fault
divorce ... at least not in Louisiana.3 And therein lies the rub.
Assume, for example, that Jack and Jill, two sweethearts who live in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, decide that they are going to get married. Jack, overpowered
with emotion, suggests that they get a covenant marriage because they are deeply
in love and want to be with each other forever. Jill agrees and after two weeks of
counseling about the seriousness of the commitment into which they are
entering, they move to Arkansas, proudly sporting a Louisiana covenant
marriage certificate.
No one in Arkansas is going to contest the validity of the marriage-it is
clear that Jack and Jill had every right to get married and the marriage is valid in
Louisiana, so there is no reason that the marriage would be declared invalid in
any other state. The problem is not the validity of the marriage; the problem
comes six months down the road, when Jack and Jill have come to the mutual
conclusion that their marriage was a mistake and want to get a divorce.
Clearly, if Jack and Jill tried to get a divorce in Louisiana, they could not
obtain a divorce; the very "covenant" nature of their marriage precludes them
from doing so. The question is, does Arkansas have to respect the "covenant"
nature of their marriage? Should an Arkansas court defer to the Louisiana
legislature? Does Louisiana law control?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine briefly the
development of no-fault divorce and the recent attempts to roll back no-fault
divorce of which covenant marriage is the most successful. This Note will
discuss some of the policy debates surrounding covenant marriage and no-fault
reform, will analyze some of the legal issues raised by covenant marriage,
eventually focusing on the questions of conflicts of law raised by covenant
marriage, and will analyze how marriage interacts with conflicts of law in
general. It is also necessary to examine an alternative approach to the traditional
marriage choice of law rules: the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
2 See 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 (West).
3 While Louisiana was the first state to have passed a covenant marriage law, Arizona
recently enacted a covenant law as well. See 1998 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 135 (West). Covenant
marriage bills remain pending in several other states, may be introduced (or reintroduced) in
others, and are likely to be passed in at least some of them. See ifra note 21 and
accompanying text.
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Constitution. This Note will explain how covenant marriage presents a new twist
on the choice of law issues and why states are not required to give effect to
particular legal rights or disabilities found in the marital law of other states. This
Note will also argue that although the Full Faith and Credit Clause may provide a
means for giving effect to the "covenant" rights granted under a covenant
marriage, interstate recognition of marriage via full faith and credit may also
require interstate recognition of same-sex marriage, a result which most
supporters of covenant marriage do not want. Finally, this Note will conclude
that covenant marriage is an inadequate and poorly-planned means of placing
limits on the no-fault regime because the conflicts of law problem is inherent in
the covenant marriage institution and drastically limits the effect of the policy.
I. FAULT, NO-FAULT, AND ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT NO-FAULT
Historically, divorce was regulated not by the state, but by the church.4 By
the late nineteenth century, however, it was universally accepted that the public
had a significant interest in the maintenance of marriage and consequently that
states should have the power to regulate divorce.5 The vast majority of states
passed laws allowing for judicial termination of marriage by the early part of the
twentieth century. These laws allowed for a granting of divorce based upon
"fault," that is, upon some wrongdoing by one of the partners. Fault grounds
almost always included adultery,6 abandonment,7 and cruelty,8 but many other
grounds have also been included, which vary state by state.9
4 In the United States, however, divorce was treated as a "civil rather than ecclesiastical
matter" as early as 1630. See GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 11-12
(1991).
5 See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
6 See, e.g., ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 1 (1992)
(describing adultery as one of the grounds for a fault divorce). Adultery is generally defined as
voluntary sexual intercourse by a married person with someone other than his or her spouse.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990); see also Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A
Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605,
609 (1996).
7 See PARKMAN, supra note 6, at 1.
8 See id.
9 Other "faults" in state laws include "unnatural sexual behavior before or after the
marriage," alcoholism, drug abuse, long-term imprisonment, "lack of physical ability to
consummate marriage," and a "wife['s] pregnan[cy] by another at the time of the marriage
without the husband's knowledge." See, e.g., DANIEL SITARz, DIVORCE AND DISSOLUTION OF
MARRIAGE LAWs OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1990) (describing fault provisions of Alabama
divorce law). Fault provisions have varied over time and by state, and a general canvassing of
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This situation changed dramatically in 1969, when California adopted the
nation's first no-fault divorce law.10 This law not only eliminated fault as the
required basis for a divorce, but also eliminated it as the basis for alimony and
property division.11 By the end of 1996, sixteen states had abolished all fault-
based grounds for divorce,12 thirty-two had added no-fault provisions to the
existing fault grounds,13 and all fifty states had adopted some no-fault
provisions.14
the historical grounds for fault is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the
historical grounds for divorce in the United States, see RILEY, supra note 4.
10 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4350 (West 1983).
11 California law actually roots the grounds for divorce in one of two places:
"[i]rreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage,"
or "[i]ncurable insanity." CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 1994). Because California is a
"community property" state, "all community and quasi-community property is divided equally
between the spouses" as a general matter, unless there is a prior agreement otherwise. See
SrrARZ, supra note 9, at 21; see also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4800-4800.3 (West 1997). As to
alimony awards, the California code has enacted a ten-factor balancing test to determine the
appropriateness and amount of such an award, but the courts do not normally consider "marital
misconduct" in such analyses. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4801 (West 1997); SrrARZ, supra note
9, at 22.
127The states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming, as well as the District of Columbia. In addition, Nevada and Kansas have specified
incompatibility as the only grounds for divorce in their respective states. See Linda D. Elrod &
Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in the Family Law: Of Welfare Reform, Child
Support, and Relocation, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765 app. at tbl. 4 (1997).
13 The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, and, of course, Louisiana. See id.
14 By 1978, fifteen states had abandoned fault altogether, reasoning that "irretrievable
breakdown" should be the only ground for a divorce; sixteen others added "irretrievable
breakdown" as a ground while also retaining historical fault. See RILEY, supra note 4, at 163
(citing Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Outline, 11 FAM.
L.Q. 297, 297-313 (1977) and Robert Raphael et al., Divorce in America: The Erosion of
Fault, 81 DIcK. L. REV. 719, 719-31 (1977). For a discussion of how divorce laws compared
among the states in the late 1980s, see SrrARz, supra note 9. Ohio, for example, currently
provides for divorce on any of the following grounds:
(A) Either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage from which the
divorce is sought; (B) Willful absence of the adverse party for one year, (C) Adultery; (D)
Extreme cruelty; (E) Fraudulent contract (F) Any gross neglect of duty; (G) Habitual
drunkenness; (H) Imprisonment of the adverse party in a state or federal correctional
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No-fault divorce was initially suggested as a panacea to correct what legal
thinkers saw as major problems with the fault system: its expense and tendency
to create bitterness between the parties, as well as the growing problem of
fabrication of grounds for divorce.15 Legislatively, no-fault was a huge success,
but even early on, it began to engender problems that the legal reformers had not
necessarily expected. In 1973, only four years after California had touched off
the "no-fault revolution," the author of a divorce manual for women observed
that the reform had created a dilemma for dependent wives and children who
wished to protect themselves and their marriages. 16 By the mid-1980s, it had
become apparent that no-fault impacted many women quite negatively in
practice; many women who had placed their careers on hold to work in the home
or at lower-paying jobs were left with little or no income when their wage-
institution at the time of filing the complaint; (I) Procurement of a divorce outside this
state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which the party who procured it is released from
the obligations of the marriage, while those obligations remain binding upon the other
party; (J) On the application of either party, when husband and wife have, without
interruption for one year, lived separate and apart without cohabitation; (K)
Incompatibility, unless denied by either party.
OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 3105.01 (West 1997) (emphasis added).
15 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 191, 195 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Henna Hill Kay eds., 1990) [hereinafter
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS]. As Professor Weitzman observes:
Over time, in actual practice, many divorcing couples privately agreed to an
uncontested divorce whereby one party, usually the wife, would take theproforma role of
the innocent plaintiff. Supported by witnesses, she would attest to her husband's cruel
conduct and he would not challenge her allegations. But even if the testimony was staged,
it nevertheless reflected what the courts considered "appropriate violations" of the
marriage contract-and thus reinforced what were seen as the sex-appropriate obligations
of marriage itself.
LENORE J. WErIzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 8 (1985).
16 Barbara Hirsch writes:
The young man who tires of the obligations of wife and children can simply dissolve
the marriage and reduce his duties to writing a check once a month.... How can a
woman defend her marriage from dissolution in a no-fault proceeding? Doesn't it seem
fair that if one party seeks to preserve the marriage, the other should then be obliged to
prove that because of her misconduct, he's won the right to leave her?
BARBARA B. HIRSCH, DIVORCE: WHAT A WOMAN NEEDS TO KNOw 73 (1973).
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earning husbands were easily able to obtain divorces. 17 At the same time, many
conservative thinkers began to express the belief that no-fault engendered a
culture that devalued marriage in general. 18 By the mid-1990s, several states had
attempted to roll back the no-fault reforms, but none of these efforts were
particularly successful. 19
I1. COVENANT MARRIAGE
Louisiana's passage of 1997 House Bill 75620 (perhaps the no-fault reform
movement's first major victory) touched off a deluge of bills creating covenant
marriages in other states, including Alabama, California, Nebraska, and Ohio.21
17 Compare MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUsION OF EQUALiTY 36-52 (1991)
(critiquing the "equality discourse" that has shaped the policies regarding the economic aspects
of divorce), and id. at 79-94 (critiquing same as it shapes the laws of child custody), with
Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROssROADs, supra note 15, at 100-01 (concluding, based on sociological
data, that "it seems unlikely that the adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce played the
dominant role in producing reduced awards to divorced wives").
18 See, e.g., MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE 143 (1996)
(characterizing no-fault divorce as outlawing marriage).
19 See Elizabeth Schoenfeld, Drumbeats for Divorce Reform, 77 POL'Y REV.: J. AM.
CITIZENSHIP at 8-10 (May-June 1996) (describing introduction of no-fault reforms in several
states in 1996).
20 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 (West).
21 On May 21, 1998, Arizona joined Louisiana and enacted its own covenant marriage
law. See 1998 Ariz. Legis Serv. 135 (West). Several other states which have covenant marriage
bills pending as of August, 1998, include: Michigan, see H.B. 5990, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 1997); Ohio, see H.B. 567, 122d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997); South Carolina, see
H.B. 961, 122d Leg. (S.C. 1997); and Virginia, see H.B. 1056 (Va. 1998), available in LEXIS.
Several other states contemplated enacting covenant marriage laws in 1997 and early
1998, but most of these bills died in committee or failed to pass both houses before the end of
the year's session. See H.B. 30, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) (passed Alabama House; 1998 Alabama
Senate regular session adjourned April 27, 1998, not caried over); S.B. 1377, Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1997) (failed passage of California Senate Judiciary committee; reconsideration granted); S.B.
440, 144th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1997) (passed Georgia Senate; 1998 Georgia House regular
session adjourned March 19, 1998, not carried over); H.B. 1052, 110th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(nd. 1998) (Indiana House regular session ended while bill in committee); H.B. 2839, 77th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997) (Kansas House regular session ended while bill in committee, not
carried over); S.F. 2935, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997) (Minnesota Senate regular session
ended while bill in committee, not carried over) and H.F. 2760, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
1997) (Minnesota House regular session ended while bill in committee, not carried over); H.B.
1201, 1222, 1645, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1998) (All related bills died in the Mississippi House
committee Judiciary A) and S.B. 2910, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1998) (died in the Mississippi Senate
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The law amends Louisiana's civil code, not to eliminate no-fault provisions,22
but to restrict their application. For example, each of Louisiana's "divorce
grounds" provisions is now preceded by the phrase "[e]xcept in the case of a
covenant marriage." 23 The law defines a covenant marriage as follows:
A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one male and one female who
understand and agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship.
Parties to a covenant marriage have received counseling emphasizing the nature
and purposes of marriage and the responsibilities thereto. Only when there has
been a complete and total breach of the marital covenant commitment may the
non-breaching party seek a declaration that the marriage is no longer legally
recognized. 24
A "complete and total breach of the marital covenant" is the language that
Judiciary committee); L.B. 1214, 95th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 1997) (indefinitely postponed
by Nebraska Legislative Judiciary committee); H.B. 2208, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla.
1997) (passed Oklahoma House; 1998 Senate regular session while bill in committee, not
carried over); H.B. 2101, 100th Leg. (Tenn. 1997) (Tennessee House regular session ended
while bill in committee, not carried over); S.B. 6135, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997)
(Washington Senate regular session ended while bill in committee, not carried over); H.B.
4562, 73d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 1998) (West Virginia House regular session ended
while bill in committee, not carried over).
The status of covenant marriage in these states is unclear, at least one legislator in Indiana
has indicated that he will reintroduce a covenant marriage bill in the 1998-99 session. See
Suzanne McBride, Proposal Would Make Couples Look Before a Leap, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Aug. 13, 1998, at Al (reporting that Rep. Dennis Kruse plans to introduce a covenant marriage
bill in the next legislative session). It seems safe to say that, despite the setbacks covenant
marriage faced in the 1997-1998 legislative session, the debate surrounding it is not nearly
over.
22 Title V of Louisiana's civil code deals with divorces and allows for divorce "upon
proof that: ... [t]he spouses have been living separate and apart continuously for a period of six
months or more on the date the petition is filed... .. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 103(1) (West
Supp. 1998). Alternatively, Louisiana courts may grant a divorce:
upon motion of a spouse when either spouse has filed a petition for divorce and upon
proof that one hundred eighty days have elapsed from the service of the petition, or from
the execution of written waiver of the service, and that the spouses have lived separate and
apart continuously for at least one hundred eighty days prior to the filing of the rule to
show cause.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 102 (West 1997).
23 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 art. 102 (West) (amending LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
102-03 (West 1997)).
24 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 3-272(A) (West).
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returned marital fault to American law. Under a Louisiana covenant marriage, it
is possible to obtain a divorce "only upon proof of any of the following:" (1)
adultery, (2) commission of a felony and subsequent sentence of death or
imprisonment "at hard labor," (3) one-year abandonment, (4) sexual abuse of the
spouse or a child of one of the spouses, (5) separate habitation without reconcile
for two years, or (6) separate cohabitation after a judgment of separation of bed
and board, for: one year, if the marriage produced no children; eighteen months,
if the marriage produced any minor children; or one year, if the judgment of
separation was based on abuse of a minor child of one of the spouses.25
Describing conditions like one-year abandonment or separate habitation for
two years as a "return to fault" may seem somewhat misleading, but compared to
Louisiana's "regular" divorce statute (which requires only a six month
separation), imposing such conditions is a major step.
In order to obtain a covenant marriage, a couple must not only procure a
marriage license, but also execute a "declaration of intent" to contract a covenant
marriage.26 Such a declaration must include recitation of a special oath27 and the
25 See 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 4-307(A) (West) (emphasis added). The law
allows for a judgement of separation from bed and board for most of the same "faults," but
adds "habitual intemperance... or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages ... [if] such ill-
treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable," and (of course)
removes the references to divorce after judgment of separation from bed and board. See 1997
La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 4-307(B) (West). Changes to the law of separation from bed and
board, although a major provision of the Louisiana law, will be discussed only fleetingly in this
Note.
26 See 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 3-272(B) (West).
27 The suggested oath reads as follows:
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman
who agree to live together as husband and wife so long as they both may live. We have
chosen each other carefully and disclosed to one another everything which could
adversely affect the decision to enter into this marriage. We have received premarital
counseling on the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of marriage. We have read the
Covenant Marriage Act, and we understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life. If we
experience martial [sic] difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to
preserve our marriage, including marital counseling.
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby declare that our
marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant Marriages and we promise to love,
honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our lives.
1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 3-273(A)(1) (West).
Several questions come to mind regarding this oath, including possible Establishment
Clause violations. See discussion infra Part IV. A. However, this Note will deal primarily with
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signing of an affidavit by the parties that they have received premarital
counseling.28 It must be accompanied by a notarized attestation by the counselor
as to the nature of that counseling and also that the couple received an
informational pamphlet which "provides a full explanation of the terms and
conditions of a covenant marriage." 29 It must also include the notarized signature
of both parties.30 Covenant marriage bills pending in other states follow the same
basic pattern, but sometimes modify the recognized "faults," adding different
recognized bases for divorce31 or other measures to harmonize the bill with the
existing law in that state.
The motivations behind covenant marriage are many, but essentially boil
down to a belief that no-fault divorce has had a detrimental effect on the
American family32 and created a culture in which marriage lacks commitment.33
the conflicts of law issues, see discussion infra Part V, and the choice of law issues, see
discussion infra Part VII.
28 The counseling, according to the law, must be by "a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the
Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor,"
and must "include a discussion of the seriousness of covenant marriage, communication of the
fact that a covenant marriage is a commitment for life," a discussion of the obligation to seek
counseling, and a discussion of the legal grounds for divorce in a covenant marriage. See 1997
La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 3-273(A)(2)(a) (West). The fact that the law compels counselors to
engage in a legal discussion of the ramifications of covenant marriage raises questions about
the unauthorized practice of law. These questions will be addressed infra Part IV.B.
29 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 3-273(A)(2)(b) (West).
30 See id. § 3-273(A)(3)(a).
31 Alabama's bill, for example, allows ajudgement of divorce "[i]n favor of either party,
when the other was, at the time of the marriage, physically and incurably incapacitated from
entering into the marriage state'" H.B. 30 6(1), Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) Indiana's bill allows
divorce upon a showing of "impotence existing at the time of the marriage." H.B. 1052 §
4(b)(2), 110th Leg., Reg. Sess. (nd. 1998). One covenant marriage bill actually removed no-
fault grounds from the state's existing marriage laws, and establishes covenant marriage as a
separate type of marriage where adultery is not available as a fault ground. See H.B. 1222 § 2,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1998). This bill thankfully died in committee and another Mississippi bill
tracks the Louisiana law more closely. See H.B. 2910 (Miss. 1998). Nebraska's bill tracks the
Louisiana law, but adds a provision for ten hours of mandatory marriage counseling before a
divorce can be granted. See L.B. 1214 § 7(2)(0, 95th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 1997).
32 Louisiana Representative Tony Perkins, who sponsored the covenant marriage law
through the Louisiana House, puts it this way:
I think we've come to a point in our culture that we realize that the no-fault divorce
system has failed .... [D]ivorces between 1970 and 1990 increased by 34 percent....
[IT]he issue of teen-age crime, violence, delinquency, teen-age pregnancy, all of that is
tracing back to broken homes. And we have a vested interest in keeping children in stable,
two-parent homes. And that's what this is about.
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Interestingly, these beliefs are no longer the exclusive property of conservatives;
both First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton 34 and former Clinton campaign
supervisor James Carville35 have expressed support for the goals of the
Louisiana law, and Amitai Etzioni's Communitarian Network has been
advocating for reforms similar to covenant marriage since 1993.36
Today: Lynne Gold-Bikin and Tony Perkins, Representing Opposing Sides, Discuss the
Proposed Covenant Marriage Law (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997), transcript
available in 1997 WL 11222538 (page numbers unavailable online).
33 Louisiana State University Law Professor Katherine Spaht, one of the drafters of the
Louisiana law, explains some ofthe reasoning for the law:
The opportunity for seriously examining the meaning of marriage (mandated by the
covenant marriage law) will help to prevent hasty and ill-advised marriages and it will
impress upon couples that do marry the gravity of the marriage contract. It will provide
them with a firmer foundation upon which to build a lifelong relationship and stable
family.
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Would Louisiana's 'Covenant Marriage 'Be a Good Idea for America?
Yes: Stop Sacrificing America's Children on the Cold Altar of Convenience for Divorcing
Spouses, INSIGHT, Oct. 6, 1997, at 24, available in 1997 WL 11444482.
34 She states:
When you're responsible for children, you have to put their interests at least equal with if
not ahead of your own. There is a lot of evidence about the traumas and difficulties that
divorced mothers face, financially and emotionally, and also about what happens to the
children. I know there are many instances where a situation is intolerable. But what I
would hope is that we would be more honest talking about the costs of divorce, and when
parents seek a divorce, there would be a waiting or cooling-off period when counseling
programs would be available, maybe even required.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, quoted in Walter Isaacson, "We're Hoping That We Have Another
Child": An Exclusive Interview with the First Lady, TIME, June 3, 1996, at 28; see also Hillary
Rodham Clinton, Make Divorce Harder for Kids' Sake, DET. NEWs, Jan. 28, 1996, at All
(arguing that getting a divorce should be much harder when there are children involved).
3 5 See James Carville, It'll Make You Think Twice-Louisiana's New Covenant Marriage
Law Ain 'tMore Than Half Bad, SALON (June 30, 1997) <http//www.salonmagazine.comjune
97/columnists/carville.htnl> (arguing that while the goals of Louisiana covenant marriage law
are admirable, it is flawed in that it makes no distinction between marriages with children and
those without children and asserting that once children are involved, every marriage should
become a covenant marriage).
3 6 See Amitai Etzioni & Peter Rubin, Opportuning Virtue: Covenant Marriages, the
Louisiana Experience, and Beyond, in OPPORTUNING VIRTUE: LESSONS OF THE LOUISIANA
COVENANT MARRIAGE LAW, A COMMUNITARIAN REPORT 1 (The Communitarian Network ed.,
1997) [hereinafter OPPORTUNING VIRTUE].
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Despite the recent groundswell of support for covenant marriage, it remains
unclear how many couples are exercising that option. In the month after the
Louisiana law was passed, only twenty-six couples opted to apply for covenant
marriage licenses, compared to the more than three thousand "normal" marriage
licenses granted in a typical summer month.37
IV. PROBLEMS WITH COVENANT MARRIAGE
Although both liberals and conservatives have praised the aims of
covenant marriage, there remain skeptics. Sociologist Judith Stacey believes that
covenant marriage is a no-fault repeal in disguise and "open[s] the door to going
back to the bad old days of divorce, making divorce nastier, more expensive,
[and] more harmful to children." 38 The Louisiana chapter of the ACLU, which
lobbied against the law, believes that the law "involves the government in
enforcing religious doctrine," and will "clog our already overcrowded court
system with very acrimonious, lengthy divorces where one party has to prove
that the other party did a despicable act in order to get the divorce." 39
Actually, Etzioni's "supervows" proposal is somewhat more flexible than Louisiana's
covenant marriage law:
"Supervows" would send a powerful message. Such vows are premarital contracts in
which those about to be betrothed declare that they are committing more to their marriage
than the law requires. They may choose from a menu of items what they wish to
incorporate in their voluntary agreement. For instance, if either spouse requests marital
counseling, the other promises to participate. If one asks for a divorce, he or she promises
to wait at least six months to see if differences can be worked out. Once the couple freely
arrives at an agreement, the supervows become legal commitments between the spouses.
Amatai Etzioni, How to Make Marriage Matter, TIME, Sept. 6, 1993 at 76, reprinted in
OPPORTUNING VIRTUE, supra.
Several other scholars have called for a similar "private contract" approach to marriage.
See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Liing the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 464-65 (1998) (arguing that "[w]ithin limits, couples
should be authorized to legally define their own marriages").
37 See New Form of Marriage Not That Popular, THE CHARLEsToN DAILY MAIL, Oct.
15, 1997, atD3.
38 CBS This Morning: Louisiana State Representative Tony Perkins and Sociologist and
Author Judith Stacey Discuss the Pros and Cons of Covenant Marriages (CBS television
broadcast, July 7, 1997), transcript available in 1997 WL 5627539, at *1.
39 The News: Analysis: Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law (MSNBC cable television,
June 24, 1997), transcript available in 1997 WL 11863357, at *1.
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A. Establishment ofReligion
The religious freedom objections to covenant marriage are based in the
Establishment Clause;40 the basic argument is that the law involves the state in a
religious enterprise.41 The law mandates that all couples wishing to enter into a
covenant marriage must sign a declaration containing language that tracks
traditional marriage vows42 and also that they must receive counseling from a
"priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, any clergyman
of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor."43
The drafters of the law, however, went to great pains to ensure that it would
survive any Establishment Clause challenge. The oath, although it does suggest a
particular view of marriage, makes no explicit reference to religion at all-it
merely states that "marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman who
40 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment ofreligion ... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. Although the Establishment Clause literally refers only to Congress, it has been
interpreted to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994).
41 The three-prong test for Establishment Clause violations was enunciated by the Court
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test requires that a law have a "secular
legislative purpose," that the primary effect of the law must "neither advance nor inhibit
religion," and that the law "must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion."' Id. at
612-13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The Lemon test, however,
has been much criticized and has fallen into disuse; the Court may simply stop using the test,
without overruling Lemon. See, e.g., Grumet, 512 U.S. at 704 (1994) (striking down New York
law in part because it failed to exercise civil power in a neutral way, citing but not applying
Lemon). But see id. at 710-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (describing Grumet as an application
of the Lemon test). See generally John Kevin Moore, Casenote, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet: A Missed Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Clarify
Establishment Clause Analysis, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1189, 1195 (1995) (stating that, by
"choosing to use both Lemon and strict neutrality principles, the Court rejected any notion that
it might formulate a new analysis for Establishment Clause issues"); Stephanie E. Russell,
Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause Tests, Looking Past the Lemon: Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 60 Mo. L. REv. 653, 676 (1995)
(concluding that, although the Court virtually ignored the Lemon test in its analysis of Grumet,
"Lemon will remain the standard until the proper Establishment Clause test(s) are made clear
by a majority of the Court"). See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Mouches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ridiculing the Lemon test). But see
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (applying aspects of the Lemon test regarding
excessive entanglement).
42 "We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman who
agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live." 1997 La. Sess.
Law Serv. 1380 § 3-273(A)(1) (West).
43 Id. § 3-273(A)(2)(a).
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agree to live together as husband and wife so long as they both may live."44
Furthermore, the particular wording of the oath is not mandatory; the law
requires only "[a] recitation by the parties to the ... [oath's] effect."45 No
religious motivation is suggested in the law or in the oath; in fact, the supporters
of the law have indicated that the primary motivation behind the law was pure
social policy: divorce is harmful to children, families, and society as a whole, and
as such divorces should be difficult to obtain 4 6 Likewise, the law does not
mandate religious counseling; it merely states that a couple must receive
marriage counseling and suggests that religious leaders are well qualified to
provide that counseling. If the couple wishes, they can receive that counseling
from a secular professional.47
The Supreme Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence indicates
that merely because a law's goals coincide with the beliefs of religious groups
does not mean that the law serves an impermissible religious purpose.4 8 The
Court has described a central idea of the Establishment Clause as the principle
"that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to
irreligion." 49 The clause, however, does not prevent the state from passing
legislation that relates only incidentally to religion. In Bowen v. Kendrick,50 for
example, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life
Act, in part because even if the statute was partially motivated by improper
concerns, it "was also motivated by other, entirely legitimate secular
concerns."51 Despite the fact that the Adolescent Family Life Act "enlists the
involvement of religiously affiliated organizations in the federally subsidized
programs," 52 the Court concluded that "[n]othing in our previous cases prevents
Congress from making such a judgment or from recognizing the important part
that religion or religious organizations may play in resolving certain secular
44 Id. § 3-273(A)(1).
45 Id.
46 See supra notes 34-35.
47 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 3-273 (A)(2)(a).
48 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 n.8 (1988) (finding "no reason to conclude
that the... [act at issue] serves an impermissible religious purpose simply because some of the
goals of the statute coincide with the beliefs of certain religious organizations").
49 Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38,52-54 (1985)).
50 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
51 Id. at 603.
52 Id. at 606.
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problems. '53 This rationale seems particularly appropriate to Louisiana's
covenant marriage law, which, like the act in question in Bowen, enlists a "wide
spectrum of organizations," 54 both religious and secular.55 Based on the Bowen
standard, it seems fair to conclude that despite the fact that the law contemplates
that religious entities may be involved in its application, and notwithstanding that
the law coincides squarely with the religious purpose of sanctifying marriage, it
will likely survive any constitutional challenges based on establishment of
religion.
B. Practice ofLaw
Louisiana's covenant marriage law requires that all couples wishing to enter
into a covenant marriage receive counseling "as to the nature and purpose of the
marriage and the grounds for termination thereof'56 and that the counseling,
conducted by "any clergyman of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor," 57
include "a discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant
marriage by divorce or by divorce after a judgment of separation from bed and
board." 58 These requirements invite an investigation as to whether the law
requires those clergy and marriage counselors who perform covenant marriage
counseling to engage in the practice of law without benefit of a state license.59
As a preliminary matter, it seems obvious that even if covenant marriage
laws do require clergy and marriage counselors to engage in behavior that could
be considered the "practice of law," it is difficult to describe that behavior as
"unauthorized" because the covenant marriage statute itself authorizes it!6 0
Notwithstanding, it is valuable to examine the statutory definitions of legal
53 Id. at 607.
54 Id. at 608.
55 Louisiana, however, seems to be having trouble enlisting some religious organizations;
the state's Roman Catholic bishops have announced that Catholic Church officials will not
perform the legal counseling required by the law, on the belief that the Catholic faith
recognizes only one type of marriage. See Bruce Nolan, Bishops Back Off Covenant Marriage,
NEW ORLEANS Tms-PICAYUNE, Oct. 30, 1997, at Al.
56 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 3-273(A)(2)(b) (West).
57 Id. §3-273(A)(2)(a).
58 Id.
59This discussion presumes that the clergy and counselors who engage in covenant
marriage counseling will receive some sort of remuneration for providing that service. While
this is by no means certain, it is likely that some benefit will flow unto them; marriage
counselors, in particular, are unlikely to work for free.
60 But see infra text accompanying notes 80-90.
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practice and compare them with the duties that are required of counselors and
clergy under the statute. While it is highly unlikely that clergy and lay counselors
will be sanctioned for unauthorized legal practice, a wiser public policy choice
may be to reserve some of the counseling mandated by the covenant marriage
law to persons with legal training.61
There is no general consensus as to what constitutes "the practice of law."62
Furthermore, each state regulates unauthorized practice in different ways, and
some do not regulate it at all.63 An American Law Institute initiative to adopt
uniform rules in this area has been postponed,64 and states have been left to their
own devices to determine what constitutes "the practice of law," and whether or
not activities that fall under that rubric should be reserved exclusively to lawyers.
In states that have a narrow definition of the practice of law, advising a
couple on the legal ramifications of a decision to enter into a covenant marriage
would seem to be permissible. For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
has determined that:
Generally speaking, whenever, as incidental to another transaction or calling, a
layman, as part of his regular course of conduct, resolves legal questions for
61 The primary rationale advanced for prohibitions against unauthorized practice is "to
protect the public from the consequences of inexpert legal services." CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASsOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 5.5 note at 464-65 (1992). While the practice of
covenant marriage counseling may not be "unauthorized," see supra text accompanying note
60, if it involves counseling on complex legal issues and lay counselors are unequipped to deal
with those issues, the policy rationale for unauthorized practice prohibitions would apply
equally to this "authorized" practice.
62 See, e.g., 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W.W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERNG 814 (2d
ed. 1990) (describing it as "practically impossible" to define what constitutes the outer limits of
the practice of law).
63 Arizona, for example, has no statute or court rule sanctioning unauthorized practice.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' RESPONSIBILrIY FOR
CLIENT PROTECTION, 1994 SURVEY AND RELATED MATERIALS ON THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW/NONLAWYER PRACICE 63 (1996). Enforcement of rules forbidding
unauthorized practice has been described as "inactive" or "non-existent' in at least eight states.
See id. at 15. Forty states reported at least moderate enforcement of unauthorized practice
prohibitions. See id. Louisiana, however, reported "active" enforcement of unauthorized
practice of law violations. See id at 18.
64 See RESTATEMENT (TiRM) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWXYERS, TENTATIVE DRAFT NO.
8, REPORTER'S MEMORANDUM at xxix (1997), available in WESTLAW, Restatement
database. Originally, § 9 of the Restatement, which was to include issues of unauthorized
practice, was to be eliminated. That decision has been revisited in the most recent draft, and
"[t]he present intent is to attempt a reduced draft of the Chapter." Id at * 17.
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another-at the latter's request and for a consideration-by giving him advice or
by taking action for and in his behalf, he is practicing law if difficult or doubtful
legal questions are involved which, to safeguard the public, reasonably demand
the application of a trained legal mind.65
Under this definition, a counselor giving advice about the obligations of a couple
under the Louisiana covenant marriage law would not, at first glance, seem to be
engaged in the practice of law. The statutory language employed regarding the
obligations of a covenant marriage (under Louisiana law) is relatively clear66 and
probably does not require the "application of a trained legal mind" to explain;
67
the legal aspect of the counseling is "incidental" to the social one; and-because
the legislature has placed its imprimatur on the counseling--"safeguard[ing] the
public" does not seem to be a concern.
Minnesota's definition of legal practice is, however, uncommonly narrow.
Other states have interpreted the practice of law much more broadly. Ohio is
representative of the majority position and defines the practice of law to include
"all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law."68 Louisiana itself is notably broad in its definition of legal practice,
including within its statutory definition "[tihe advising or counseling of another
as to secular law.' 69
Louisiana's covenant marriage law certainly mandates that couples receive
counseling as to secular law; the law requires that the couple attest that the
counseling they received included "a discussion of the exclusive grounds for
legally terminating a covenant marriage by divorce or by divorce after a
judgment of separation from bed and board."70 While it may be argued that the
provisions of the law itself are straightforward and do not require the services of
65 Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788,796 (Minn. 1951).
66 That is, as far as statutory language goes.
67 But see infra text accompanying notes 70-78.
68 Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 193 N.E. 650, 650 (Ohio 1934). Other
states have defined legal practice in similar ways. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-6(b)(2) (1997)
(defining practice of law to include advising or counseling another as to secular law); Arkansas
Bar Ass'n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ark. 1959) (defining practice of law to include "all
advice... in matters connected with the law"), modified and limited by Creekmore v. Izard,
367 S.W.2d 419 (Ark. 1963); Gallagher v. First Dependable Mortgage Co., 605 A.2d 785, 786
(N.J. 1992) (stating that law is practiced "whenever and wherever legal knowledge, training,
skill and ability are required."); R.I Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 417 (Okla. 1972)
(holding that when activity includes giving advice or opinion of legal effect, it is practice of
law).
69 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:212 (West 1996).
70 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 273(A)(2)(a) (West).
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a lawyer to explain, the various legal issues raised by covenant marriage may
well be beyond the training of those who are responsible for the counseling
required by the law. For example, the "Declaration of Intent" that must be filed
by a couple seeking a covenant marriage includes the phrase, "we do hereby
declare that our marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant
Marriages. ' 71 While this phrase seems innocuous to the non-legally trained eye,
a competent attorney would surely recognize it to be a choice of law clause and
would immediately seek guidance in the applicable law as to its validity.72 If the
choice of law clause is invalid, it may be that Louisiana law does not necessarily
control the termination of a covenant marriage, with the effect that the
counselor's "discussion of the exclusive grounds for legally terminating a
covenant marriage" is not only legal advice, but bad legal advice. In addition,
while the term "divorce" is commonly understood by the layperson, it is not clear
that a "judgment of separation from bed and board" is as widely understood. The
covenant marriage law, by its terms, does not require counselors to discuss when
a judgment of separation is obtainable,73 and for good reason: one wanders into
murkier legal waters when discussing the effects of such a judgment. The
covenant marriage law has special provisions detailing when subject-matter
jurisdiction for a judgment of separation is proper,74 special venue rules apply,75
and such a judgment creates new rights of suit between the parties.76
Furthermore, the law seems to instruct that a temporary reconciliation between
the parties after a judgment of separation can nullify that judgment "unless the
spouses execute prior to the reconciliation a matrimonial agreement that the
community shall not be reestablished upon reconciliation. '77
The ramifications of a judgment of separation, therefore, seem well beyond
the expertise of the clergy or counselors who are by law required to refer to it.
While the law requires only that counselors sign a "notarized
attestation... confiming that the parties were counseled as to the nature and
purpose of the marriage and the grounds for termination thereof,"78 the parties
71 STATE OF LOUIsIANA, DECLARATION OF INTENT, COVENANT MARRIAGE (1997)
[hereinafter DECLARATION OF INTENT] (copy on file with the author).
72 For a discussion of the validity of the choice of law provision, see discussion infra Part
VII.
73 See 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380 § 273 (West).
74 See id § 308(B)(1).
7 5 See id. § 308(B)(2)-(3).
76 See id. § 308(A).
7 7 Id. § 309(B)(2).
78 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. § 273(A)(2)(b) (West).
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are required to affirm that the counseling included "a discussion of the exclusive
grounds for legally terminating a covenant marriage... after a judgment of
separation from bed and board."79 It seems unlikely that a counselor or member
of the clergy would be aware that a judgment of separation can be nullified by a
temporary reconciliation, effectively rendering that judgment useless and placing
that portion of the premarital counseling in error.
Louisiana courts have chosen, in other contexts, to give a very broad
interpretation to the concept of legal practice.80 In this instance, however, the
Louisiana legislature has effectively exempted the activities of covenant
marriage counselors from that broad definition. While this activity is not
unprecedented in Louisiana law,81 there is some debate as to the ability of the
legislature to regulate the legal profession in this manner. In Alco Collections,
Inc. v. Poirer,82 a Louisiana court of appeals discussed the issue:
[T]he legislature cannot enact laws defining or regulating the practice of law in
any aspect without the [Louisiana] supreme court's approval or acquiescence
because that power properly belongs to the supreme court and is reserved to it by
the constitutional separation of powers. Accordingly, a legislative act purporting
to regulate the practice of law has commendatory effect only until it is approved
by the supreme court as a provision in aid of its inherent judicial power.
Moreover, the supreme court will ratify legislative acts that are useful or
necessary to the exercise of its inherent judicial power, but it will strike down
791 Id. § 272(A)(2)(a).
80 See, e.g., Croker v. Levy, 615 So. 2d 918, 921 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (accountant's
written agreement to render "business, financial and other assistance, including securing for
[client] reputable legal counsel" in exchange for large contingency fee based on legality of will,
was void as unauthorized practice of law); Pisarello v. Administrator's Serv. Corp., 464 So. 2d
917 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (counseling regarding prescription of claims constitutes the practice of
law); Andrus v. Guillot, 160 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (collection agency engaged in
practice of law when it gave legal advice to clients); La. Op. Att'y. Gen., No. 91-539 (1991)
(giving legal advice and preparing, notarizing, and recording legal document for trust is
practice of law). But see State v. Kaltenbach, 587 So. 2d 779, 786 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(defendant who assisted students in their studies in course on "common law" and owned a "law
library" did not engage in the practice of law); Aycock v. Miller, 18 So. 2d 335 (La. Ct. App.
1944) (action of clerk in reading application of counsel for preliminary default was ministerial
duty required by court rule).
81 See Collection Agency Regulation Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3576.19 (West)
(purporting to authorize certain non-lawyers to institute lawsuits on behalf of clients to collect
debts); see also Alco Collections, Inc. v. Poirer, 680 So. 2d 735, 744 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting interpretation of Collection Agency Regulation Act that authorizes non-lawyers to
institute lawsuits).
82 680 So. 2d 735 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
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statutes which tend to impede or frustrate its authority.83
The Louisiana Supreme Court struck down just such a law in Succession of
Wallace.84 In that case, the legislature adopted a statute providing that an
attorney designated by a testator in the testator's will could be dismissed only for
just cause.85 The court determined that the statute was in conflict with
Louisiana's Rules of Professional Conduct, which required an attorney to
withdraw when discharged, with or without cause.86 As such, the court relied on
its state constitutional authority to regulate the legal profession and struck down
the statute, which it determined "would degrade this court, weaken the
profession, and impede the administration of justice.' 87
Based on Succession of Wallace, it is possible that, despite the legislature's
"authorization" of covenant marriage legal counseling by non-lawyers, those
counselors could still be engaging in the "unauthorized practice of law," because
regulation of the practice is reserved to the judiciary. If, upon review, the
Louisiana Supreme Court determines that the covenant marriage law impedes its
efforts to regulate the practice of law, the statute's authorization of covenant
marriage counseling will be struck down.88 Given the complex legal questions
that may arise based on the law,89 such a result may well be the soundest public
policy choice. 90
C. Policy Debates
The public debates surrounding covenant marriage have largely overlooked
purely legal issues--instead, they have focused on practical effects and policy
choices. Supporters of covenant marriage have focused on the skyrocketing
divorce rate of the past three decades, and have placed the blame for that
83 Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
84 574 So. 2d 348 (La. 1991).
85 See id. at 354-55.
86 See id. at 355.
87Id.
88 See, e.g., id. at 350.
89 Including the ramifications of ajudgment of separation, discussed supra at notes 70-79
and accompanying text, as well as the conflicts of law issues, see discussion infra Part VII.
90 Other states that are considering covenant marriage laws would do well to examine
their own laws as to this issue; if there is a question as to the legislature's power to regulate the
practice of law, and the jurisdiction has a broad definition of legal practice, it would be folly to
adopt covenant marriage without making any modifications.
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phenomenon squarely on the shoulders of no-fault divorce.91 Critics of the law
point out that the correlation between the two events is largely anecdotal and is
not supported by statistics.92 Some have asserted that the choice between
marriage licenses offered by the law is no choice at all-that the existence of the
covenant marriage option will, through social pressure, "force" couples into
entering into a marriage that is more difficult to dissolve.93
Katherine Spaht, the Louisiana State University law professor who helped
draft the law, believes that the law's real focus is to protect women and children
from the negative consequences of divorce:
Restoration of power to the innocent spouse provides important protection
for women and children, particularly where the wife has chosen to forego or to
interrupt her career for the purpose of bearing and rearing children. A woman
undoubtedly risks more by assuming her marriage is a lifelong
relationship.... [And] [i]n the final analysis, Louisiana's covenant marriage
experiment is about nourishing our children by strengthening marriage as an
institution.94
Opponents of covenant marriage have attacked this view: "[To] suggest that
[covenant marriage] is better for children ... is to close one's eyes to the fact that
there was juvenile crime long before no-fault divorce .... Divorce is not the
91 See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the
Meaning ofMarriage, 73 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 1547 (1998).
92 
"mT]here never has been any correlation between the incidence of divorce and the laws
on the books. The surge in divorces in the 1960s well preceded no-fault legislation." Ashton
Applewhite, Q: Would Louisiana's 'Covenant Marriage'Be a Good Idea For America? No: It
Won't Lower the Divorce Rate and Will Raise the Human and Economic Cost of Divorce,
INSIGHT, Oct. 6, 1997, at 25, 25.
93 Compare Editorial, Covenant Marriage: State Should Stay Out of "Fixing" Institution,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 6, 1997, at A8 ("What self-respecting newlywed wants to think of
his or her commitment as only 'standard'?"), with Amatai Etzioni, Covenant Marriage in
Context, in OPPORTUNING VIRTUE, supra note 36, at 18 ("Most people would agree that
allowing individuals to make choices is the exact opposite of coercion.").
94 Katherine Shaw Spaht, Q: Would Louisiana's "Covenant Marriage" Be a Good Idea
for America? Yes: Stop Sacrificing America's Children on the Cold Altar of Convenience for
Divorcing Spouses, INSIGHT, Oct. 6, 1997, at 24, 24.
Professor Spaht has indicated that the law was inspired in part by the research of
psychologist Judith Wallerstein, who has concluded that the impact of a divorce during
childhood increases as children grow older. See id at 24-25. Dr. Wallerstein's study has been
attacked for failing to follow accepted research methodologies. See Katha Pollit, What's Right
About Divorce?, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A29.
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issue; parents and parenting skills is the issue."95
Critics of the law have noted that the mere existence of covenant marriage as
an option furthers the problem it is meant to address (the devaluation of
marriage) by trivializing all marriages that are not "covenant" in nature; one
observer complained that "from now on, my marriage-and yours and that of
every other hitched person you know-will be considered an ordinary, grade-B
matrimony, regardless of our tear-jerking VOWS. ' 96 Another described covenant
marriage as a "Trojan Horse" that "cheapens marriage by suggesting that you
and I were not serious when we exchanged our vows." 97 Louisiana's Catholic
and Episcopal Bishops seem to have been persuaded by this argument: Catholic
Bishops have stated that their employees will not engage in covenant marriage
counseling, and Episcopal Bishop Charles Jenkins has strongly condemned the
law as a step into a flawed past.98
The raging policy debates have been entertaining,99 but one thing is clear:
despite the good intentions of its supporters, only a small number of couples
getting married in Louisiana have opted to enter covenant marriages. 00 A good
95 Lynne Z. Gold-Bikin, Editorial, Let's Eliminate the Idea of Covenant Marriage, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 7, 1997, § 13, at 9.
96 Daniel Radosh, Covenant Marriage: Tightening the Ties That Bind, PLAYBOY, Dec.
1997, at 59.
97 Gold-Bikin, supra note 95, at 9.
98 See Nolan, supra note 55, at Al.
99 Take, for example, interviewer Daniel Radosh's discussion with Louisiana State
Representative Tony Perkins, the Covenant Marriage bill's principal sponsor:
What if, I asked, a husband announced that he was gay?
"Urn. Well. Again, there is no .... Then he saw the loophole: "Obviously if he is
gay and engaging in the homosexual lifestyle and engaged in sex with others, that would
be adultery."
How about if the husband was going to leather bars and dancing with men but not
getting laid? "That is not a breach of contract," Perkins admitted. "It would be as if a
husband went out dancing with other women."
I threw out a few more scenarios: a wife gets an abortion behind her husband's back;
a wife bums an American flag; a wife bums an American flag in front of the children; a
husband announces that the family must begin worshipping Satan.
Suddenly, Perkins was displaying considerably less pride of authorship.
Radosh, supra note 96, at 59.
100 "A total of 26 covenant [marriage] licenses were sold in the month after the law took
effect Aug. 15 [1997]; in a typical summer month, Louisiana sells more than 3,000 marriage
licenses." Janet McConnaughey, Covenant Marriages Slow-Going in State, NEW ORLEANS
TmEs-PICAYUNE, Oct. 19, 1997, at A4.
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thing, too-once news gets out that divorce could be just across the state line,
those couples who did get a covenant marriage will be a little less secure in their
relationships.
V. INTERSTATE MARRIAGE RECOGNITION AND STATE LAW
Marriage has raised conflicts of law problems throughout modem history
and throughout the world.101 In the United States, these problems have tended to
center around the validity of the marriage. United States law in this area has
evolved primarily around the English legal principle of the lex loci
celebrationis-the idea that if a marriage is valid in the celebratory jurisdiction at
the time it is entered into, then it will under most circumstances be deemed valid
in other jurisdictions. The lex loci principle is a matter of state law, and its
application varies from state to state.102 There is, however, near-universal
101 See generally SEYMOUR E. KARMINSKI, SOME ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ENGLISH PERSONAL LAW IN THE LAST CENTURY (1963); LENNART PALSSON, MARRIAGE IN
COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS: SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS (1981) [hereinafter PALSSON,
SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS]; LENNART PALSSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN COMPARATIVE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1974); Colloquium, THE FAMILY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME
EMERGING PROBLEMS (Richard B. Lillich, ed., 1981).
102 See PALSSON, SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS, supra note 101, at 7-10 (discussing
application of lex loci rule in the United States). The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law
has added a twist to the general application of the lex loci rule, designed to avoid migratory
marriages. Section 283 of the Restatement (Second) reads as follows:
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 283 (1971) [hereinafter R.2D CONFLICTS].
Subsection (1) of the rule adopts a "most significant relationship" test to determine which law
should apply, in accordance with the general thrust of the Restatement (Second), which is full
of such rules. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LAWS 195-98 (2d ed. 1993) ("For most issues ... the Restatement [Second]
prescribes that the law of the state with the 'most significant relationship' to that issue should
be applied."). Subsection (2) restates the familiar lex loci principle, subject to a public policy
exception. Although the section states the two principles in conjunction, they are most often
used as alternatives to one another because the result of applying subsection (1) would not
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acceptance of the principle, and observers who are familiar with the law of the
celebratory state can confidently predict how a particular case will turn out in
any given factual circumstance. A common example in American law is the
marriage between relatives. In the famous case In re May's Estate,10 3 the New
York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a marriage between an uncle
and his niece.104 Such a marriage would have been illegal if celebrated in New
York, but the court upheld its validity, relying on the principle of the lex loci
celebrationis; the marriage had been celebrated in Rhode Island and was legal
under Rhode Island law.105
The lex loci principle applies the law of the jurisdiction of celebration to
determine the validity of a marriage, and a sound public policy supports the
application of this choice of law provision. The tendency of all American
jurisprudence is to preserve the validity of a marriage entered into by the consent
of the parties; the lex loci rule provides stability and does not disrupt the
expectations of the parties entering into a marriage. The rule, furthermore,
completely avoids the "potentially hideous problems that would arise if the
legality of a marriage varied from state to state."10 6
The downside of the principle, however, is that a forum state must often
suppress its own legitimate interest in the recognition of a marriage and confer
marital rights upon a couple that would otherwise not be entitled to them. 107 This
problem recently received a great deal of attention when the Hawaii Supreme
Court issued its decision in Baehr v. Lewin,10 8 indicating that the Hawaii practice
necessarily be the same as the result obtained by applying subsection (2). It should also be
noted that despite the Restatement's suggestion, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
continue to apply only the lex loci principle. See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWs § 13.5 n.l (Lawyer's ed. 1984) (citing R.2D CONFLICTs), supra, § 283(2),
which collects cases applying lex loci celebrationis.
103 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
104 See id. at4.
105 See id.
106 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 102, at 362.
107 Such a result necessarily follows wvhen the lex loci is used to validate a marriage-if
the marriage would not normally be recognized under forum law, but a court applies the law of
the state of celebration to validate it, that marriage would be entitled to all the benefits of a
marriage contracted in the forum state. See, e.g., Allen v. Storer, 600 N.E.2d 1263 (I11. 1992)
(holding that where common-law marriage would be recognized in the celebratory state, the
forum state must deem the marriage valid and confer a right to sue for loss of consortium as a
local-law incident of a valid marriage); cf. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
§ 219 (3d ed. 1977) (describing incidents of marriage as controlled by local law).
108 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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of not allowing same-sex marriages should be subject to strict scrutiny.' 09 The
subsequent federal enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act1 10 was motivated
in part by the fear that the rules of lex loci celebrationis would require
recognition of same-sex marriages in other states.
Despite the consensus behind the rule of lex loci, not all marriages are valid
everywhere. A well-recognized exception to the lex loci rule exists when a
marriage performed in one state violates a clearly established public policy of
another state.11 1 For example, suppose state A allows marriage between
different-sex first cousins-that is, a male and female who are the offspring of
siblings.112 State B, on the other hand, forbids such marriages, which it
specifically describes by statute as incestuous and contrary to public policy. If a
first-cousin couple from state B goes to state A and gets married, state B is not
bound to recognize the marriage under the lex loci rule because the marriage
violates state B's "strong public policy." 113 Note, however, that this rule is
109 See id. at 67. On remand, the trial court determined that the state had failed to satisfy
the strict scrutiny standard and that the Hawaii law restricting marriage to different-sex couples
was unconstitutional. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21-22
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), affidmem., 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
110 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 11
1996) and 28 U.S.C. (§ 1738C (Supp. 111996))).
111 The Restatement (Second) rule indicates that a marriage, valid when performed, will
be deemed valid "unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage." R.2D
CONFLICrs, supra note 102, § 283(2).
A question of definition arises as to what constitutes a "strong public policy," but the
common rule is that marriages which are defined by statute as being voidable (as opposed to
void) do not violate a "strong" public policy of a state. This question has been discussed
elsewhere. See PALSSON, SuBsTANTvE CONDmoNs, supra note 101, at 20-26; see also R.2D
CONFLICrs, supra note 102, § 283, cmt. k (discussing what constitutes a "strong public policy"
for conflicts purposes).
112 "Kindred in the fourth degree, being the issue (male or female) of the brother or sister
of one's father or mother .... First cousins [are] ... the children of one's uncle or aunt."
BLACK'S LAWDICTIoNARY 362 (6th ed. 1990).
113 See LEFLAR, supra note 107, at 448:
Many states prohibit the marriage of first cousins, while other states do not....
Most states which prohibit such marriages do not view them with much social alarm, and
say that the validity of the marriage is governed by the law of the place where it was
performed. Some states of domicile, however, take the opposite view, deeming such
marriages contrary to the "law of nature" or revealed religion, [and] therefore void. The
domicile can take whichever view it prefers on the matter, and the view taken is decisive.
Id. The Restatement (Second) indicates that the first place that a court should look for a strong
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restricted in application-it does not invalidate all marriages that violate the
public policy of a state because it only reaches those marriages that were
obtained by a couple who were married in a state not of their own domicile.114
For example, if the first-cousin couple were domiciled in state B and went to
state A to obtain a marriage, that marriage would be invalid in state B.
Conversely, if they were domiciled and married in state A and then moved to
state B, the marriage would be recognized, despite the fact that it violates state
B's public policy. 1 5
It seems unlikely, however, that the mere fact that a couple, absent any other
impediments, entered into a covenant marriage is a sufficient reason to invalidate
the marriage. Returning to the Jack and Jill hypothetical, it is difficult to see any
reason why Arkansas, their new home state, would find their marriage invalid.
Following the general rule of lex loci, the state should uphold the validity of their
marriage. Merely because Arkansas law is silent on the issue of covenant
marriages, it hardly follows that Arkansas has a strong public policy against the
recognition of such marriages. Absent the passage of specific state statutes to the
contrary, it is afait accompli that a covenant marriage performed in Louisiana
will be deemed valid in every other state.116
VI. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE AND THE CONSTITUTION
Variance among the divorce laws of the states was recognized as a problem
long before California's adoption of no-fault divorce.117 Although divorce itself
public policy is the statutes of the state in question. See R.2D CONFLICTS, supra note 102,
§ 283, cmt. k. If there is no statute, the court should determine if the marriage would be invalid
in the state of celebration by its own choice of law rules. See id. "If, however, no clear answer
can be obtained from the statute or from the decisions of the courts of the state of most
significant relationship, the forum must use its ownjudgment... "to determine if the state rule
violated is "strong public policy." Id.
114 The Restatement (Second) rule will deem a marriage valid "unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses
and the marriage at the time of the marriage." R2D, CONFLICTS, supra note 102, § 283(2)
(emphasis added). This caveat restricts the application of the rule to situations where a couple
leaves their home jurisdiction because that jurisdiction's public policy forbids their marriage.
See id.
115 See id. at cmt. k illus. 1.
116 See id. at cmt. k.
117 Ile discussion in this section assumes, unless specifically noted, that the law being
applied in any given situation is the law of the state where the divorce proceedings were
brought-the forum state. For choice of law questions raised by variance in state divorce laws,
see discussion infra Part VIII.
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has existed in the United States since Puritan times,118 it had never been a
common occurrence, and migratory divorce-where the divorce-seeker leaves
his or her jurisdiction because of its strict divorce laws and establishes residence
in a more permissive jurisdiction in order to obtain a divorce' 19-had always
been frowned upon.
In 1942, in the landmark case of Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1)120
the Supreme Court dealt with the validity, in North Carolina, of two divorces
obtained in Nevada, which had very liberal divorce laws for the time.121 In so
doing, the Court determined that due to the nature of divorce, constitutional
issues of full faith and credit were involved.1 22
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has been famously described as "the
lawyer's clause of the Constitution."'1 23 It provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."124 The clause is an important instrument of federalism because it
"restricts a State in preferring its own interests to the point where no other State
can cooperate with it in a mutually satisfactory union." 125 In the present context,
the clause controls the extent to which one state's judgment of divorce (a
"judicial proceeding" within the clause) will be given effect in other states.
The State of Nevada had, over the first half of the twentieth century, gained a
well-deserved reputation as a "divorce mill,"1126 and the defendants in Williams I
118The first known divorce in colonial America was granted in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony in 1639, on the grounds of bigamy. See RILEY, supra note 4, at 12.
119 See id. at 4.
120 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
121 See RILEY, supra note 4, at 135-43.
122 See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 291.
123 Justice Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
124 US. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
125 THE VIRGINIA COMMISSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE FULL FAiTH AND
CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AN INSTRUMENT OF FEDERALISM 4
(1966).
126 In 1905, Nevada had a residency requirement of only six months and a broad
"cruelty" fault provision that allowed for easy divorces. See RILEY, supra note 4, at 135-36. In
1913, the Nevada legislature raised the residency requirement to one year, but it was lowered
back to six months in 1915, under pressure from Nevada businesses that had lost revenue from
the subsequent fall-off of divorce-seekers. See id. at 136-37. In 1927, Nevada lowered its
residency requirement to three months, and, in 1931, it lowered the residency requirement to
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had each left their respective spouses in North Carolina to obtain Nevada
divorces so that they could be married to each other. 127 After the two defendants
satisfied the six-week domicile requirement in Nevada, they each obtained a
divorce and were married in Nevada. They then moved back to North Carolina,
where they were arrested and prosecuted under that state's bigamous
cohabitation statute.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, determined that the basic issue was
whether the Nevada judgment of divorce was entitled to full faith and credit by
North Carolina.128 The Court held that such judgments are indeed entitled to full
faith and credit and remanded the case back to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. 129 In reaching its decision, the Court assumed (but did not decide) that
the Nevada domicile was "bona fide"130 and held that the Nevada courts had
jurisdiction to decide the issue by virtue of that domicile. 131 Thus, the only
question left before the Court was a pure conflicts of law issue: whether or not
judgments of divorce in state A are entitled to full faith and credit in state B, if
state A is the domicile of one of the divorcing spouses. 132 The Court answered
this question in the affirmative, overruling its previous controlling decision in
Haddock v. Haddock.133
On remand, the Williams I defendants were re-tried and re-convicted, and
six weeks. See id. at 137.
127 See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 291.
128 See id. at 291.
129 See id. at 304.
130 See id. at 302.
131 See id. at 298-99.
132 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 102, at 365.
133 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled by Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S.
287, 304 (1942). Haddock had held that domicile within a state of one of the parties to a
marriage does not give that state jurisdiction to render a judgment of divorce enforceable in
another state. See Haddock, 210 U.S. at 606. Haddock primarily turned on a question of
jurisdiction and was decided as a question of in personam jurisdiction under the doctrine of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Williams I, the Court concluded that divorce was not
in fact "a mere inpersonam action" because domicile of the plaintiff is crucial to a divorce, but
is immaterial to actions in personam. Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 297. Because the entire Pennoyer
scheme of jurisdiction was superseded by International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), personal jurisdiction over both parties is no longer a significant concern in migratory
divorce litigation. Cf Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 1 (1997) (arguing that "even if the court has in personam jurisdiction
over both spouses, the [divorce] decree violates due process and is not entitled to full faith and
credit unless one of the spouses is domiciled in the rendering state." (citing Williams I, 325
U.S. at 236-37)).
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when the case reached the Supreme Court a second time, it was sustained. 134 In
Williams II, the Court held "[a] decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of
everything except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and domicil is
a jurisdictional fact." 135 Thus, although Williams I had held that a decree of
divorce in state A is entitled to full faith and credit in state B, under Williams 1,
state B could examine whether or not domicile was adequate to support the initial
decree of divorce. 136 In so holding, the Court noted that:
Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not merely to the immediate parties.... It
also touches basic interests of society. Since divorce, like marriage, creates a
new status, every consideration of policy makes it desirable that the effect should
be the same wherever the question arises.... As to the truth or existence of a
fact, like that of domicil, upon which depends the power to exert judicial
authority, a State not a party to the exertion of such judicial authority in another
State but seriously affected by it has a right, when asserting its own
unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or existence of that crucial fact.137
The effect of Williams H was to create a compromise over how states were
to treat determinations of divorce: domicile of one spouse may permit state A to
grant a divorce, but state B, where the absent spouse is domiciled, can re-
examine state A's finding of domicile. 138 This rule remains the law, even after
the "no-fault revolution," although the general harmonization of the several
states' divorce laws brought on by no-fault has made Williams H largely
irrelevant. 139 With the passage of the Louisiana covenant marriage law,
however, migratory divorce may again become an issue,140 and Williams I and
Williams H may return to the place of importance they once held in American
divorce law.
The leading Louisiana case in this area, Navarrette v. Joseph Laughlin,
134 See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
135 Id. at 232.
136 See id. at 236.
137 Id. at 230.
138 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 102, at 369.
139 There has been little cause to engage in examination of domicile in part because no-
fault has removed some of the incentives that encouraged migratory divorce. See generally
Helen Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era, 58 TEX. L.
REv. 501 (1980).
140 See infra notes 173-76, 180-84 and accompanying text (discussing the work of
Professor Wasserman).
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Inc.,141 creates a strong presumption against overturning foreign findings of
proper domicile:142 "[T]he burden of undermining the verity of
the... [domicile's] decree rests heavily upon [the party challenging the
decree] .... This Court will give full faith and credit to divorce decrees rendered
by courts of other states except where it has been conclusively shown by
sufficient proof' that the jurisdictional requirement of domicile was not met.143
The majority of other states share this presumption against overturning
domicile.144
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has limited the application of
Williams H in Sherrer v. Sherrer.145 The Court held that where both parties
appeared in court at the time the divorce was granted, the issue of domicile could
not be reopened by collateral attack.146 Lower courts in Louisiana following
Navarette have expanded on the Sherrer ruling, concluding that any collateral
attack on a foreign divorce is waived if both of the parties acquiesced,
participated in, or waived their rights to contest the divorce.147
Applying these general rules to Jack and Jill's situation, however, does not
seem particularly fruitful. Assume that Arkansas allows one or both of them to
file for divorce: they are both domiciliaries of the state because each has lived in
the state for six months and presumably they plan to remain there.148 If,
14124 So. 2d 672 (La. 1946).
142 See id. at 674 (citing Williams II, 325 U.S. at 226).
143 Id. While most states have adopted such a strong presumption, not all have:
While most of the... cases place the burden of showing the invalidity of the foreign
decree upon the party who assails its validity, there are some cases in which the view
seems to have been taken that no presumption as to the validity of the foreign decree
exists and that the burden rests upon the party seeking to avail himself of the foreign
decree to prove its validity by alleging and proving the jurisdictional fact of residence at
the divorce forum....
Annotation, Recognition as to Marital Status of Foreign Divorce Decree Attacked on Ground
ofLack ofDomicil, Since Williams Decision, 1 A.L.R.2d 1385 (1948).
144 See id.
145 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
146 See id. at 351-52.
147 See also Tjaden v. Tjaden, 294 So. 2d 846, 849-50 (La. 1974) (noting that defendant
was able to attack the validity of a Nevada divorce "as he did not make an appearance, execute
a waiver, or otherwise participate in or acquiesce in the Nevada proceedings").
148 The Arkansas divorce statute is dependent not on domicile, but on residency, and
requires that petitioners be a resident in the state for sixty days before the commencement of a
divorce action. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-12-307(a)(1) (Michie 1998). The statute further
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however, the Arkansas domicile is a sham, and Jack has every intention of
returning to Louisiana immediately after the divorce becomes final, then a
challenge to the divorce in Louisiana (if heard) might succeed, based upon
Williams/. 14 9 But if the Arkansas domicile is real, and a divorce is granted, it
would be entitled to full faith and credit in every state, based upon Williams L 150
But such speculation is moot-even if Jack had no intention of retaining his
domicile in Arkansas, courts would refuse to question a finding of domicile
because he acquiesced and participated in the proceedings of the divorce. It does
not matter who challenges the divorce; it could be Jack, Jill, or any other party-
because Jack and Jill both acquiesced to the proceedings, any attack on the
divorce by questioning domicile would be waived.151
Surveying the cases where foreign divorce judgments were not given full
faith and credit in Louisiana, one court observed:
It is to be noted that in most of the cases in which recognition of an out-of-state
divorce has been refused, the party either never physically resided in the other
state, or never actually severed his ties with Louisiana, or went to the other state
solely for the purpose of getting a divorce with no other reason for going and
promptly returned to Louisiana after obtaining the divorce. 152
states that residence "is defined to mean actual presence and upon proof of such, the party
alleging and offering the proof shall be considered domiciled in the state." Id. § 9-12-307(b).
While there is some dispute over the validity of substituting residency for domicile, see infra
note 153, the Arkansas courts have determined that the substitution passes constitutional
muster. See Wheat v. Wheat, 318 S.W.2d 793, 796-97 (Ark. 1958).
149 But see infra Part VII.
150 See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
151 Following the rule of Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), the presence of the
nominal "defendant" at the divorce proceedings precludes a later attack on the validity of those
proceedings.
While the Sherrer rule applies to Jack and Jill's situation, it does not apply to the
"runaway spouse" situation where one spouse travels to a foreign jurisdiction and obtains an ex
parte divorce. Assume that another hypothetical couple, Lois and Clark, both Louisiana
domiciliaries, get a covenant marriage. After six months, Lois decides she has had enough of
Clark and their marriage and changes her domicile to Arkansas, where she rents an apartment,
gets a new job, and files for divorce. If Clark acquiesces in the proceedings, he is barred from
collaterally attacking the proceedings by the line of Louisiana cases following Sherrer. See,
e.g., Tjaden, 294 So. 2d at 849-50. If he makes no appearance and othenvise remains aloof
from the proceedings, however, he can bring a collateral attack on the validity of Lois's new
domicile under the doctrine of Williams .
152 Tjaden, 294 So. 2d at 854; see, e.g., Juneau v. Juneau, 80 So. 2d 864, 866 (La. 1955)
(justifying court's failure to accord full faith and credit to a Nevada finding of domicile where
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Given the strong presumptions in favor of upholding domicile and the
limitations case law has placed on collaterally attacking domicile, it is probably
fair to conclude that in most situations, if a Louisiana covenant marriage is
dissolved by divorce in another state, that judgment of divorce will be entitled to
full faith and credit in Louisiana.153 The problem comes in getting that decree in
the first place. If Jack and Jill file for divorce in Arkansas, even though an
Arkansas court would have jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings, that court
still must determine if Jack and Jill have the capacity to divorce-that is, which
law applies, Arkansas's or Louisiana's.154
VII. DOMICILE, CONFLICTS OF LAW, AND COVENANT MARRIAGE
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law has announced the general
rule governing capacity to divorce: "[T]he local law of the domiciliary state in
which the action is brought will be applied to determine the right to divorce." 155
the wife went to Nevada immediately after a Louisiana divorce suit was dismissed and returned
to Louisiana as soon as possible upon obtaining a Nevada divorce); Eaton v. Eaton, 81 So. 2d
371, 374 (La. 1955) (stating no Arkansas domicile existed when husband lived in Louisiana
during the time of the divorce action).
153 The only situation where the state of Louisiana may deny full faith and credit to such
a decree is when the domicile of the spouse in the second jurisdiction is phony and even then,
only where the other spouse did not in any way participate in the proceedings and further
chooses to collaterally attack those proceedings. The number of cases where all of these
conditions are satisfied is bound to be very small, especially considering the relative
unpopularity of covenant marriage thus far.
154 
"[O]nce the power to decide the case is based merely upon personal jurisdiction a
court must decide as a separate question upon what basis, if any, the local substantive law of
divorce can properly be applied to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
sought." Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, J., dissenting), vacated as
moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). Arkansas, it must be observed, is one of three states that has
abandoned domicile as the fount of divorce jurisdiction, replacing it with personal jurisdiction.
See Wasserman, supra note 133, at 21-24 (describing Arkansas, fllinois, and New York as
"outlaw states" for replacing domicile with residency; advocating elimination of domicile rule
and its "choice of law corollary"). This places Arkansas in exactly the situation Judge Hastie
describes in his Alton dissent-the state has replaced domicile with residency (thus making the
source of the court's power to hear the case personal jurisdiction rather than domicile) and
should face the choice of law question. But see Wheat v. Wheat, 318 S.W.2d 793, 796-97
(Ark. 1958) (upholding a statute substituting residency for domicile, but failing to address the
choice of law issue).
155 R.2D CONFLICTS, supra note 102, § 285. This rule re-phrases the general rule found in
the original restatement: "[T]he law of the forum governs the right to divorce." RESTATEMENT
OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAW § 135 (1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Both rules assume that
subject-matter jurisdiction to divorce is founded upon domicile. See R.2D CONFLICTS, supra
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An application of the rule is illustrated in the official comments:
A and B are married in state X and make that state their home for several
years. A then abandons B and goes to state Y, where he acquires a domicil, and
there brings suit against B for divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty. The Y
court will apply its own local law, rather that the local law of X, in determining
whether A is entitled to the divorce. 156
This rule is accepted so uniformly amongst the several American jurisdictions
that it receives virtually no attention in case law; courts simply apply the law of
their own state to decide divorces, hardly ever analyzing why.157
In Alton v. Alton, 158 the domicile choice of law rule received its only
extended treatment in the case law-in a dissent.159 The Alton case examined the
note 102, § 285; RESTATEMENT, supra, § 135 crnt. a. While it is a disputed question whether
domicile is the only jurisdictional foundation for divorce, see, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note
102, §§ 15.4-7, as the law presently stands, domicile seems to be the sole source of a court's
power to grant a divorce. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975) (quoting Williams v.
North Carolina (Williams 17) 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945)) (' rhis Court has often stated that
'judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil.").
Sosna, however, made this statement only in dictum; the issue before the Court did not concern
an alternative basis for jurisdiction, but rather an additional durational residency requirement
added in addition to Iowa's domicile requirement:
Read narrowly, Sosna only upholds as reasonable the state's imposition of the
additional state requirement of one-year's duration residence.., both the majority and
one of the dissents ... assumed that domicile is a jurisdictional requirement but do not
address the question whether some other criterion might not also establish a "nexus
between person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations
and responsibilities of the utmost significance."
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 102, § 15.7 (quoting Williams 1, 325 U.S. at 229). For an
argument that domicile should be discarded as the jurisdictional predicate for divorce, see
generally Wasserman, supra note 133, at 1 (arguing that jurisdictional rules in divorce cases
produce absurd results and should be abandoned).
156 R.2D CONFLICTS, supra note 102, § 285, cmt. a, illus. 1.
157 But see Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684-85 (Hastie, J., dissenting). If the forum
choice of law rule were retained (without the requirement of domicile) in divorce cases, a
divorce system based on personal jurisdiction might make a spouse reluctant to travel to
Nevada to gamble! In Alton, Hastie believed the law of Connecticut, the marital domicile,
would most likely be applied, rather than the law of the Virgin Islands, where the action
commenced. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 102, at 188 n.8.
158 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
159 See id. at 684-85 (Hastie, J., dissenting).
1408 [Vol. 59:1377
COVENANTS AND CONFLICTS
validity of a Virgin Islands statute which allowed six weeks continuous residence
in the territory to be "'prima facie evidence of domicile' for purposes of divorce
and granted Virgin Islands courts jurisdiction over divorce "'without further
reference to domicile or to the place where the marriage was solemnized or the
cause of action arose."' 160 Essentially, the law allowed courts to grant divorce
decrees "solely on the basis of the residence of [one party in the Virgin Islands]
and personal jurisdiction over [the other]."161
Domicile, as a general matter, has been a consistent source of controversy
and confusion in the law.162 The Alton opinion is notable because it offered two
very different interpretations of the necessity of domicile to divorce
jurisdiction,163 from two very notable conflicts thinkers. 164 For present purposes,
however, only a small portion of the divorce/domicile problem will be discussed:
what has been termed the "choice-of-law corollary."' 165
The primary reason that courts have been able to avoid addressing the choice
of law question in relation to divorce is the fact that divorce is based on
domicile-that is, one of the parties is physically present in the forum state and
has an intent to "make that place his home for the time at least. '166 If these two
160 Id. at 669 (footnote omitted).
161 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 102, at 367.
162 See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.16
(3d ed. 1986) (describing the debate over the meaning of domicile during the drafting of the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws).
163 Compare Alton, 207 F.2d at 676-77 (Goodrich, J., majority opinion), with id. at 681-
83 (Hastie, J., dissenting).
164 Judge Goodrich authored a treatise on the conflict of laws, see HERBERT F.
GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938). Judge Hastie's dissenting
opinion in Alton has received considerable attention in the literature. See, e.g., RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 102, at 367-68 (describing Hastie's opinion as "forward-looking" and
'vell known to conflicts students"); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 102, § 15.14; RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARYONTHECONFLICrOFLAWS § 5.2G, n.61 (3d ed. 1986).
16 5 Wasserman, supra note 133, at 38-41.
166 R.2D CONFLICTS, supra note 102, 88 15-18. While the two general requirements for a
finding of domicile are universally agreed upon, the specific formulation of each prong has
varied widely. See BLACK'S LAv DICrIONARY 484 (6th ed. 1990) (defining domicile as
"physical presence within a state and the intention to make it one's home"); see also
GOODRICH, supra note 164, at 38-41 (physical presence required; intent is "sufficient if the
intended stay is of sufficient permanence to make the place in question 'home,' although there
may be a probability or even a certainty that the home will subsequently be changed.");
LEFLAR, supra note 107, at 15-16 ("physical presence.., coinciding with the state of mind of
regarding the new place as one's present home"); RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 102, at 5
("physical presence in the jurisdiction and the intent 'to make that place his home for the time
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conditions are satisfied, then the individual is domiciled in that state. In his
dissent in Alton, Judge Hastie observed that it is this finding of domicile that
allows divorce courts to bypass a choice of law analysis, which would be proper
in any other type of case: 167
So long as one of the spouses has had a domiciliary relationship to the
forum it has been conventional theory that the forum has sufficient connection
with the domestic relation which is the subject matter of suit to justify not only
the exercise of its judicial power to decide the controversy, but also the
application of its own substantive law of divorce as well. It is quite possible that
some of the difficulties which have arisen in this field are the result of failure to
keep in view that these are distinct problems although the existence of a
domiciliary relationship is thought to solve both. 168
Thus, it is thefinding of domicile that grants to courts the inherent power to apply
the forum state's own substantive law of divorce to the case at bar; any divorce
law, such as the one at issue in Alton, which eliminates domicile as a requirement
for divorce should force courts to engage in a standard choice of law analysis: 169
[O]nce the power to decide the case is based merely upon personal jurisdiction a
court must decide as a separate question upon what basis, if any, the local
substantive law of divorce can properly be applied to determine whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought .... [I]f it should appear that [the two
spouses] were both domiciled in [another state] at the time of suit.. . it may well
be that under correct application of conflict of laws doctrine... it is encumbent
[sic] upon the [forum state], lacking connection with the subject matter, to apply
at least").
167 "In addition to shielding state courts from the difficulty of choosing the law to govern
transient divorce actions, the choice-of-law corollary spares courts the challenge of applying
another state's law." Wasserman, supra note 133, at 38.
168 Alton, 207 F.2d at 684-85 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, J., dissenting) (citation omitted),
vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
169 Given the heated debates over what theories and rules should drive choice of law
analysis, it may be disingenuous to describe any choice of law analysis as "standard." Professor
Wasserman, in arguing for the abandonment of the domicile "choice-of-law corollary," has put
forth several choice of law rules, based on different theories, to replace it.
No particular choice of law theory has dominated legal thought during the past century;
instead, commentators have continued to advocate, and courts have continued to apply, various
theories and sometimes even a mish-mash analysis. See, e.g., RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra
note 102, at 241-42 (describing current choice of law theory as being in "a state of disarray").
1410 [Vol. 59:1377
COVENANTS AND CONFLICTS
the divorce law of some state that has such connection .... 170
Judge Hastie, therefore, determined that domicile was not the only basis for
jurisdiction; however, his opinion was a dissent. Judge Goodrich, writing for the
majority, surveyed the case law and reached a very different conclusion:
We think that the premise that divorce jurisdiction is founded on domicile is
still the law. It was reiterated by the Supreme Court in unequivocal
language .... If that premise is to disappear in the light of real or supposed
change in social concepts, its disappearance should be the result of the action of
higher authority than ours .... We think that adherence to the domiciliary
requirement is necessary if our states are really to have control over the domestic
relations of their citizens .... Domestic relations are a matter of concern to the
state where a person is domiciled. An attempt by another jurisdiction to affect
the relation of a foreign domiciliary is unconstitutional even though both parties
are in court and neither one raises the question.171
Judge Goodrich's opinion, upholding the domicile requirement for divorce
jurisdiction, never reached the interesting choice of law question Judge Hastie's
dissent proposed. Domicile remains the foundation for divorce jurisdiction, and
courts continue to bypass choice of law analysis in divorce litigation. The rule of
the Restatement (Second), that "[t]he local law of the domiciliary state in which
the action is brought will be applied to determine the right to divorce," 172
remains controlling in every American jurisdiction. 173
Professor Rhonda Wasserman has lately taken up Judge Hastie's cause; in a
recent article, she advocates "permitting the states to abolish the domicile rule
and its choice of law corollary"'174 and replacing them with a requirement of
personal jurisdiction over the defending spouse and a standard choice of law
analysis to determine which state's law should control the dissolution of the
marriage.175 Professor Wasserman has indicated that the major rationale for the
domicile rule, which is state sovereignty, "lost much of its force with the advent
of no-fault divorce in the 1960s and 1970s," because "unhappily married people
170
,Alton, 207 F.2d at 685 (Hastie, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 676-77.
172 R.2D CONFLICTS, supra note 102, § 285.
173 "[O]nly three states authorize their courts to assert divorce jurisdiction in the absence
of a domiciliary connection to the state .... [And] [e]ven these 'outlaw' states continue to treat
divorce as a local action and apply forum law to all divorce actions filed in their courts."
Wasserman, supra note 133, at 20-24.
174 Id. at5.
175 See id. at 38-41.
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no longer have reason to evade their home state's divorce law."176
However diminished the role of forum shopping may have been before
covenant marriage, it is no longer so trivial-at least not in Louisiana. Jack and
Jill have every reason to evade the divorce laws of Louisiana because they are
unable to obtain a divorce under those laws. Professor Wasserman's solution,
furthermore, requires the passage of a federal statute or uniform state legislation
to ensure compatibility with the Constitution and uniform enforcement.1 77
Whatever logic this solution has, it creates practical problems for both couples
wishing to obtain divorces and for the states attempting to clarify their divorce
laws.
A possible criticism of the standard choice of law rule is that it unfairly
impacts couples who are unable to travel to other jurisdictions to obtain
divorces-that is, low-income couples. Conflicts scholar Robert Leflar alludes to
this problem: "Where have been two sets of grounds for divorce in the law of a
conservative divorce state, one written officially in its own law books and the
other available under its conflicts rules to local spouses who could afford the
expense and inconvenience of going to an easy divorce state .... 178 Clearly this
presents a problem for poorer couples looking to divorce, but the problem is with
the "conservative" state's divorce law rather than its choice of law rules, which
are the same as those of almost every other state. 179
Judge Goodrich, in his Alton opinion, offered an eloquent defense of the
domicile requirement for divorce jurisdiction and, by implication, the "choice of
law corollary" that Judge Hastie and Professor Wasserman critique:
[A]dherence to the domicilliary requirement is necessary if our states are really
to have control over the domestic relations of their citizens .... In the Virgin
Islands incompatibility of temperament constitutes grounds for divorce. In
Connecticut it does not We take it that it is all very well for the Virgin Islands to
provide for whatever matrimonial regime it pleases for people who live there.
But the same privilege should be afforded to those who control affairs in
Connecticut. 180
17 6 Id. at27.
17 7 See id. at 57-62.
178 LEFLAR, supra note 107, at 459.
17 9 At this early stage, it remains unclear whether the covenant marriage laws adopted in
Louisiana and Arizona will have a disproportionate impact on the poor, who cannot afford to
travel across state lines to get a divorce. This question may be a fruitful topic for future social
science research.
180 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 676-77 (3d Cir. 1953) (citations omitted), vacated as
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Judge Goodrich's argument is persuasive: states should have the ability to
control the affairs of their own citizens and should not have to subjugate that
control to another state whose interest in those affairs is not as great. Jack and Jill
are Arkansas domiciliaries-should Arkansas law on divorce defer to Louisiana
law just because their marriage was performed in Louisiana?
In all fairness to Judge Hastie, the choice of law analysis that he and
Professor Wasserman advocate would most often lead to the application of
forum law anyway.181 In Alton itself, Judge Hastie suggests that non-forum law
could properly be applied only "if it should appear that Mr. and Mrs. Alton were
both domiciled in [state A] at the time of the suit in [state B] and that their
estrangement had resulted from conduct" in state A.182 Because Jack and Jill are
both domiciled in Arkansas, Arkansas law would control their divorce even
under Judge I-astie's analysis. This becomes slightly more tricky in the context
of a migratory divorce, but according to Judge Hastie's rule, the forum state
should apply its own law if that state's domicile rules are satisfied. 183
moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
81 Professor Wasserman observes:
Regardless of the choice-of-law theory adopted, in many if not most cases, the forum
properly would choose its own divorce law to govern the dispute. Because the petitioning
spouse likely would file in a state with a substantial connection to one or both of the
parties, the forum state would have sound reasons for choosing its own law.
Wasserman, supra note 133, at 41; see also Alton, 207 F.2d at 685 (Hastie, J., dissenting)
(discussing when choice of law of non-forum state might be appropriate).
182 Alton, 207 F. 2d at 685 (Hastie, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
183 Professor Wasserman suggests:
[I]t would not be particularly difficult to draft a choice-of-law rule, similar to many
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws rules, to govern transient divorce
actions .... Nor would it be difficult to apply governmental interest analysis to divorce
actions. Nor would it be difficult to draft a territorial rule, similar to many of Restatement
(First) of Conflicts of Laws rules .... None of these rules or approaches would be
completely free from criticism, but neither is any choice-of-law rule or approach. The
point is, it should be no more difficult to choose the law to govem divorce than any other
interstate case.
Wasserman, supra note 133, at 40-41 (citations omitted). While Professor Wasserman's
analysis is sound, it should be noted that there are strong public policy reasons to favor the
traditional rule and continue applying the law of the forum state. Professor Robert Leflar has
observed that the choice of forum law in divorce:
[the choice of forum law in divorce] furnished the safety valve that enabled states with
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While Professor Wasserman does not advocate any specific choice of law
proposal in conjunction with her suggestion that domicile considerations be
removed from divorce law,184 she admits that in most cases "the forum state
would have sound reasons for choosing its own law."185 Thus, even those who
advocate a choice of law analysis would tend to defer to the law of the forum
state. This discussion, of course, is purely academic-the law continues to tie
divorce to domicile, and the law of the domiciliary state (i.e., the forum state)
still controls. Someone, however, evidently failed to inform the drafters of the
Louisiana covenant marriage law.
VIII. INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE, COVENANT MARRIAGE, CHOICE OF LAW,
AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR MARRIAGE
Despite the universal rule applying forum law to divorce, there may be other
ways to give extraterritorial effect to a Louisiana covenant marriage: one
possible way is to construe the covenant marriage "declaration of intent" to
include a choice of law clause,1 86 and the other is to grant marriage recognition
in every state via the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause.187 Both
methods, however, require that the restrictions on no-fault divorce, which are the
heart of the law, be re-characterized as "marital rights" or "incidents" of
marriage.
While the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law has one provision
limited grounds for divorce to retain laws that were apparently required by local political
expediency but which were realistically impractical for many of their citizens.... The
rule is justifiable primarily by the fact that it best served the multi-state needs of our
federal system in the troubled social and mixed-up legal field in which divorce laws had
to operate.
LEFLAR, supra note 107, at 460. The advent of covenant marriage and the variance amongst
the states' substantive laws of divorce reinforce Professor Leflar's argument. Thus, even if
Professor Wasserman's suggestion to "sever the knot" between divorce and domicile is
accepted, the choice of law rule that is adopted should be one which favors application of the
law of the forum state.
184 See Wasserman, supra note 133, at 39-46.
185 Id. at41.
186 The declaration of intent concludes with the sentence: "With full knowledge of what
this commitment means, we do hereby declare that our marriage will be bound by Louisiana
law on Covenant Marriages and we promise to love, honor, and care for one another as
husband and wife for the rest of our lives." DECLARATION OF INTENT, supra note 71 (emphasis
added).
187 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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dealing with the "Law Governing Right to Divorce," 188 it has a completely
separate provision addressing the "Incidents of Foreign Marriage." 189 The
official comment to the rule defines its scope:
A marriage, like any other status, is important primarily on account of the
incidents which arise therefrom. Among the normal incidents of a marriage are
that the spouses may lawfully cohabit as man and wife and that the issue of their
marriage will be legitimate. Other important incidents are the marital property
interests which each spouse may have in the other's assets and the forced share
or intestate share which the surviving spouse has in the estate of the deceased
spouse. Still another incident is that a party to the marriage is the "spouse" of the
other, or as the case may be, the "husband," "wife" or "widow" of the other
within the meaning of these terms when used in a will, trust or other
instrument. 190
Thus, the "incidents" of marriage might properly be construed to include all
the legal benefits that flow from the marriage status. 191 A case could therefore be
made that the "benefit" of fault in a divorce is an incident of a covenant marriage
because one spouse seeking to prevent a divorce could assert the covenant nature
of the marriage as a defense to the divorce action of the other spouse.
The law applied in determining a grant of incident has traditionally been the
law of the forum state,192 which would preclude covenant rights from being
188 See R.2D CONFLICTS, supra note 102, § 285.
189 See idJ § 284.
190 Id. §285 cmt. a (citations omitted).
191 Examples of "rights acquired by marriage" include the right to sue for alienation of
affection (when the right is recognized by state law), see Van Ellen v. Meyer, 207 N.W.2d 552,
553 (Iowa 1973), and the right to maintain an action for loss of consortium, see Michael v.
Harrison Rural Elec. Coop., 292 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa 1980). Other states have used the
term "marital rights" to include the right to a specified share in the spouse's personal estate
upon the spouse's death. See, e.g., In re Dean's Estate, 166 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Mo. 1942). For a
discussion on the right of sexual cohabitation, see Kelley v. Kelley, 77 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360 (Ct.
App. 1969) ("rights pertinent to companionate aspects of marriage" and "enjoyment of
association, sympathy, confidence, domestic happiness, the comforts of dwelling together in
the same habitation, eating meals at the same table, and profiting by the joint property rights as
well as the intimacies of domestic relations"); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 286 P. 747, 748 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1930). Despite the fact that most married couples might think that Hawkins presents a
somewhat idyllic view of the institution of marriage, it remains good law and has been
repeatedly cited for its definition of "marital rights."
192 "A state usually gives the same incidents to a foreign marriage, which is valid under
the principles stated in § 283, that it gives to a marriage contracted within its territory." R.2D
CONFLICTS, supra note 102, § 284.
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granted in non-covenant marriage states. 193 Unless the forum state's law happens
to recognize covenant marriage, that state will not grant the incident of a fault
requirement to divorce. This outcome might be reversed, however, if a covenant
marriage "declaration of intent" were deemed to include a valid choice of
Louisiana law to govern the marriage or if marriage is granted full faith and
credit under Article IV of the United States Constitution. Either way, the law
governing the marriage would become the law of the state of celebration; the lex
loci celebrationis would not only govern the validity of marriage, but also the
"incidents which arise therefrom." 194 This rule has the benefit of certainty and
foreseeability because the parties to the marriage could determine prior to the
nuptials exactly how getting married will effect them, and those effects would
not change even if they moved to a state with vastly different laws.
It would, however, take a tremendous change in the law to achieve this
outcome. As an initial matter, it should be noted that the Louisiana Civil Code
specifically describes the "Incidents and Effects of Marriage," and covenant
rights are not among those described.195 Assuming, however, that the
characterization of "covenant rights" as an incident of marriage is correct, that is
only half the battle.196 A change in the law would have to be made to ensure that
193 Robert Leflar describes the current state of the law as follows:
Once the status comes into existence by the law of the domicile of the parties, its
existence should be recognized everywhere .... That does not mean, however, that all the
incidents of the status may be exercised to the same extent, or at all, at every place at
which they are sought to be exercised. Thus, a wife does not cease to be a wife by
removal of the family domicile from Iowa to Arizona. But while domiciled in Iowa she
was entitled to a portion of her husband's personal property as dower on his death, yet on
removal of the domicile to Arizona she may cease to be entitled to any dower whatever.
The right to dower is a local incident of the marital status, and may be controlled by local
law without affecting the existence of the status.
LEFLAR, supra note 107, at 443 (citation omitted).
194 R.2D CONFLICrs, supra note 102, § 284 cmt. a.
195 
"incidents of marriage," under Louisiana law include fidelity, support, and assistance.
See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 98 (West 1993). Additionally, "[s]pouses mutually assume the
moral and material direction of the family, exercise parental authority, and assume the moral
and material obligations resulting therefrom," LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 99 (West 1993), and "a
married person may use the sumame of either or both spouses as a sumame." Id. at art. 100.
196 This assumption is for analytical purposes only; no cases have been found which
indicate that that such rights would in fact be an incident. For other definitions of incidents, see
supra note 192. In fact, there may be good reasons why covenant rights are not an incident of
marriage: other such incidents usually coincide with a private right of suit. While covenant
rights might be an affirmative defense against divorce, it does not seem that the Louisiana
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those covenant rights followed a couple from state to state.
One way to accomplish this goal would be to construe the covenant marriage
"declaration of intent" as a valid choice of law clause. The pertinent language
reads: "[w]ith full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby
declare that our marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant
Marriages .... ,"197 This language arguably creates a choice of law provision
whereby the couple agrees to bind themselves by Louisiana law no matter where
they move or what might happen.
If part of the declaration is construed as a choice of law provision it seems
fair to construe the rest of the agreement as contractual in nature as well-the
bottom line being that the declaration would be a prenuptial agreement. Even
though the declaration makes no mention of property division, which is generally
the primary subject of a prenuptial agreement, it fits the bill in almost every other
aspect: the declaration certainly constitutes "an agreement between prospective
spouses made in contemplation of marriage and to be effective upon
marriage," 198 which is the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act's definition of the
term.
While neither the Uniform Act nor Louisiana's Code has previously allowed
legislature intended that spouses attempting to assert those rights should be able to recover
damages or other remedy independent of a divorce action. See, e.g., 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv.
1380 § 4 (West). For example, the covenant marriage law does not create a legal or equitable
right of suit for abandonment; that is, Jack could not sue Jill with the intent of forcing her to
come home or pay damages.
197 DECLARATION OF INTENT, supra note 71.
198 UNWORM PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1), 9B U.L.A. 371 (1987). This is the
definition of a premarital agreement accepted by a majority of states. It is not, however, the
Louisiana definition-Louisiana, it should be recalled, is unique amongst American states in
that it follows a form of the civil law. As such, Louisiana has "matrimonial regimes" outlined
in its code which govern the dispensation of marital property. Louisiana defines a "contractual
regime" (or "matrimonial agreement," a.k.a. prenuptial agreement) as follows:
A matrimonial agreement is a contract establishing a regime of separation of
property or modifying or terminating the legal regime. Spouses are free to establish by
matrimonial agreement a regime of separation of property or modify the legal regime as
provided by law. The provisions of the legal regime that have not been excluded or
modified by agreement retain their force and effect.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2328 (West 1985). Thus, Louisiana couples are free to enter into
contracts disposing of marital property, except that they may not "renounce or alter the marital
portion or the established order of succession. Nor may the spouses limit with respect to third
persons the right that one spouse alone has under the legal regime to obligate the community or
to alienate, encumber, or lease community property." Id. art. 2330.
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contractual modification of the non-property incidents of marriage, 199 the
covenant marriage law purports to do just that. If the declaration is accepted as a
contract, one question presents itself quite insistently: is it enforceable?200
In the past, contracts which purported to alter the obligations of the marital
relation were uniformly deemed unenforceable.20  This has changed
dramatically in recent years-the adoption of no-fault divorce is one facet of this
change, the wide acceptance of prenuptial agreements is another. However,
despite these modifications, the default rule remains. It also remains true today,
as it was in the last century, that marriage "is something more than a mere
contract."202 The covenant marriage agreement, by contrast, seems to be merely
a premarital contract-traditionally, it would have been unenforceable. Even in
the era of covenant marriage, premarital agreements must be very limited in
scope to be deemed reasonable, fair, and enforceable. While Louisiana has taken
the step of enshrining covenant marriages into its own public policy, other states
are likely to determine that the declaration of intent is merely hortatory203 as
exceeding the proper bounds of premarital agreements.
However, there is at least one other way of enforcing "covenant" rights:
granting marriage full faith and credit.204 However, even assuming that marriage
199 See UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987); LA. CrV.
CODEANN. art. 2330 (West 1985).
200 "An unenforceable contract is one for the breach of which neither the remedy of
damages nor the remedy of specific performance is available, but which is recognized in some
other way as creating a duty of performance, though there has been no ratification."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8 (1979).
201 See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1456-
58 (describing historical prohibition against contractual alteration of marriage relation).
202 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
203 See Singer, supra note 201, at 1461 (describing "contracting" as a method of detailing
the obligations within a marriage; stating that such contracts are generally not enforceable).
204 Interstate marriage recognition has recently resurfaced as a hotly contested issue on
the national scene. Since the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993), which determined that strict scrutiny should be applied to that state's policy of
restricting the issuance of marriage licenses to different-sex couples, a movement has been
afoot nationwide to prevent recognition of same-sex marriages performed in one state from
compulsory recognition in other states. The federal government became involved in the debate
by enacting into law the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), which
purports to allow states to deny recognition of such marriages.
The validity of DOMA, however, is questionable. While many have argued that DOMA
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, it is perhaps more
problematic that the DOMA legislation acts in an area that has been traditionally reserved to
the states, arguably violating the Tenth Amendment.
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determinations are granted full faith and credit, it seems likely that the secondary
effects of such recognition will cause the option to not be pursued by covenant
marriage proponents; such recognition could open the door to universal
recognition of same-sex marriages, a result which the largely conservative and
religious supporters of covenant marriage most definitely do not want.
Granting full faith and credit to decrees of marriage is a tricky business and
Marriage recognition, and domestic law generally, is an area in which Congress has no
proven authority to legislate. Congress premised its action in enacting DOMA upon the second
sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which states that "Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Leaving aside for the moment the textual argument
that this grant of authority does not extend to the actions taken by DOMA, it is unclear that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause is even an issue in play when discussing interstate marriage
recognition. The purpose of DOMA, according to the House Report, was to remove the Full
Faith and Credit Clause from the recognition inquiry: "By taking the Full Faith and Credit
Clause out of the legal equation surrounding the Hawaiian situation, Congress will to that
extent protect the ability of the elected officials in each state to deliberate on this important
policy issue free from the threat of federal constitutional compulsion.' H.R. REP. NO. 104--664,
at 17 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,2921.
Given that it is state, not federal, law that controls marriage recognition, it is puzzling that
Congress believed that it had the authority to enact the DOMA. Congressional authority to
legislate under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is preconditioned upon the assumption that the
Clause actually controls the subject of such legislation-the "Acts, Records and Proceedings"
which authorizes Congress to "prescribe the Manner... and the Effect thereof' are the same
Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings to which "Full Faith and Credit shall be given." If
Congress was aware that marriage is a domestic relations matter reserved to the states (and it
seems to have been, see H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 6-8), it must also have been aware that it
was beyond its own powers in that area. See generally Julie L.B. Johnson, Comment, The
Meaning of "General Laws": The Extent of Congress's Power Under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
1611 (1997) (arguing that DOMA exceeds Congress's authority to enact "'General Laws"
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws,
and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.L 1965, 1999-2007 (1997)
(arguing that DOMA exceeds the authority of Congress under the "Effects Clause" of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause); Melissa A. Provost, Comment, Disregarding the Constitution in the
Name of Defending Marriage: The Unconstitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 8
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 157 (1997) (arguing that DOMA violates the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supremacy Clause); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note,
The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 1435 (1997) (arguing that DOMA is antithetical to the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
But see Daniel A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the "Effects Clause" of Article IV,
Section 1 and Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307
(1998) (arguing that Congress has wide latitude under the Effects Clause and that DOMA is
constitutional).
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would have effects far beyond giving covenant marriage laws effect outside of
Louisiana. It would require, at least as the law currently stands, the abandonment
of the public policy exception to the lex loci rule and would also require states to
recognize marriages that are contrary to their respective public policies. While it
has been argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause contains a public policy
exception, 205 the Supreme Court has not yet recognized such an exception and
has in fact recently suggested that no such exception exists. 206 Without a public
policy exception, full faith and credit may be granted not only to covenant
marriages, but to same-sex and first-cousin marriages as well.
Only two courts, however, have ever held that marriage must be recognized
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.20 7 One was the Supreme Court of
Arkansas, which stated, without citation or comment: "While Arkansas
recognizes a valid common law marriage-that is, one consummated in a state
authorizing that procedure-the recognition is accorded because, to do
otherwise, there would inevitably be involved a denial of full faith and credit."20 8
The court never explained why it thought full faith and credit was involved, and
it did not indicate whether its application was a matter of state or federal law.209
The other court was a New York trial court;210 that case was never appealed, and
the trial court provided no case authority for its determination that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause was implicated.211 Furthermore, both cases actually dealt with
a choice of law issue: whether a state that had abolished common-law marriage
could recognize the existence of such a marriage if it would be valid under
205 See Crane, supra note 205, at 315 n. 40 (discussing Professor Lawrence Tribe's
argument that there is a "public policy exception" to the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see also
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 28 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2932 (describing
Professor Tribe's belief that the Full Faith and Credit Clause contains a public policy
exception).
2 06 
"[O]ur decisions support no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and
credit due judgments." Baker By Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 664 (1998).
20 7 See Ram v. Rambarack, 571 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991):
Common-law marriages in New York State were outlawed by statute in 1933. However, a
common-law marriage validly consummated in another state or jurisdiction (for example,
Washington, D.C.) can be recognized in New York under the doctrine of full faith and
credit if the other state recognizes the validation of a common-law marriage.
Id. at 191 (citations omitted); see also Orsbum v. Graves, 210 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1948).
208 Orsburn, 210 S.W.2d at 498.
209 See id.
210 See Ram, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
211 See id.
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another interested jurisdiction's law.212 This is, clearly, a thin basis for an
argument that full faith and credit is implicated in interstate marriage
recognition.
The vast weight of precedent, in fact, points in the other direction-
recognition of interstate marriage is a matter reserved to state law in which the
Full Faith and Credit Clause has only a limited role.213 While many
commentators have argued that full faith and credit should be given to decrees of
marriage,2 14 this has not been, and is not now, the law.
Without the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the defenders of covenant
marriage are left only with the uncertain argument that covenant rights are an
incident of marriage (even though they are not so described in Louisiana law)
and that the couple chose that the incidents of their marriage would be governed
by Loi~isiana law (even though that promise is likely unenforceable). Armed
with such a thin argument, up against the weight of a rule that has withstood time
without so much as being questioned in the courts,215 it is near-certain that the
effect of covenant marriage will be confined to the states that adopt it. As a
result, couples like Jack and Jill will be able to divorce in any other state.
IX. CONCLUSION
Covenant marriage or no, the debate over no-fault divorce reform will
2 12 See idat 191; Orsburn, 210 S.W.2d at 498.
213 See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment
on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QuINNIPAC L. REv. 191, 193 (1996)
(describing the distinction between acts and judgments in the Supreme Court's Full Faith and
Credit jurisprudence; explaining why divorce is granted full faith and credit while marriage is
not).
214 See, e.g., Habib A. Balian, Note, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and
Credit to Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 397,415 (1995) (arguing that the rationale behind
the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to divorce decrees applies just as forcefully
to declarations of marriage); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and
Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REv. 499,
501-04 (1995) (arguing that marriage is covered under the Full Faith and Credit Clause). But
see David P. Currie, Full Faith & Credit to Marriages, I GREEN BAG 207 (1997) (stating that it
would be "wondrous strange" if the Full Faith and Credit Clause required interstate recognition
of same-sex marriage).
215 While Judge Hastie and his followers argue that choice of law analysis should be
applied to determine what law controls a divorce, no such champion has emerged to argue that
choice of law analysis should determine what law applies in the granting of marital rights.
States, after all, should be able to control the rights of their own doniciliaries, and who else but
their domiciliaries can be granted the privileges of marriage?
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continue to rage. However, those lawmakers who believe in no-fault divorce
reform should be aware that covenant marriage is not a viable solution. By
contrast, those who continue to believe in the viability of a reformed no-fault
divorce may take comfort in the unpopularity of the covenant marriage option in
Louisiana, but they cannot expect that option to remain confined to one small
southern state.216
While the passage of the Louisiana covenant marriage law may represent a
victory for the no-fault divorce reform movement, it is a small victory. A
fundamental problem with the law-its passage against a legal background
where capacity to divorce is governed by the law of the forum state, rather than
the state where the marriage was celebrated-renders it ineffective against
anyone who can afford to move out of Louisiana. As a result, covenant marriage
will have an unfair impact on Louisiana's poorest citizens. The only question that
remains is how great that impact will be.
2 16 See supra note 21.
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